The evolution of identity development is traced from Freud’s early writings to Erikson’s extrapolations and theoretical expositions, Marcia’s empirical operationalization, and finally to alternative theories that have been introduced since 1987 (Berzonsky, Grotevant, Waterman, Kurtines, Adams, and Côté). The issues of measurement and intervention, which have been crucial to the evolution of identity as a researchable construct, are also reviewed. The alternative theories are conceptualized as addressing aspects of Erikson’s work that were not addressed by Marcia’s identity status model. To facilitate the broadening of identity theory to include more of Erikson’s ideas, taxonomies for understanding relations among the alternative theories, and a system for integrating them, is introduced. Finally, suggestions for the development of future identity theory and research are offered.

Questions of identity have become central to many people’s lives, especially as they make the transition from childhood to adulthood. The young person may spend years asking questions such as: Who am I? What are my values and goals? What is my life purpose? What makes me different from other people? Am I really the same person from one year, or decade, to the next? These questions can play a central role in identity development during the adolescent and youth period as well as through adulthood (e.g., Erikson, 1980; Stephen, Fraser, & Marcia, 1992). But, what exactly is identity, and how does it develop during different periods of the life course? To what extent is identity formed as an individual project, to what extent is it a function of interacting in social and cultural contexts, and to what ex-
tent is it an combination of the two? Finally, how exactly do these aspects of its formation take place psychologically and socially?

These questions have been debated in the social science literature for 50 years, ever since Erikson (1950) published his first writings on identity. Erikson was one of a number of classic theorists to establish a tradition of identity theory (others include Blos, 1962; Cooley, 1902; James, 1892; G.H. Mead, 1934). He was careful to distinguish identity from self, which is loosely defined as that part of the person that knows and experiences reality (Harter, 1988), and self-concept, which can be characterized as one’s awareness of “the internal organization of external roles of conduct” (Hormuth, 1990, p. 2).

Erikson tended to straddle the conceptual fence between the intrapsychic focus adopted by psychology and the environmental focus adopted by sociology (Côté, 1993; Côté & Levine, 1987, 1988). Erikson’s (1968) definition of identity included both internal and social-contextual dimensions: “ego identity …” is the awareness of … self-sameness and continuity … [and] the style of one’s individuality [which] coincides with the sameness and continuity of one’s meaning for others in the immediate community” (p. 50, italics added).

Erikson’s definition was multidimensional, broad, and inclusive, as is his theory as a whole, and it paved the way for nearly half a century of further theorizing, exposition, and research on identity. However, given that Erikson’s theory did not have the benefit of drawing on years of empirical and conceptual work, the progress that has been made as a result of the work inspired by his theory may call for an updated and more precise understanding of what identity is, how it is formed, and how it functions. This understanding would have to be consistent both with Erikson’s multifaceted view of identity (e.g., Côté & Levine, 1988; van Hoof, 1999) and with the empirical research that has been conducted using Eriksonian and neo-Eriksonian conceptions of identity (e.g., Berzonsky & Adams, 1999; Waterman, 1988).

Accordingly, the purpose of this article is to trace the evolution of identity as a concept, beginning from Erikson’s own theoretical and philosophical roots in Freudian theory and continuing through Erikson’s work, Marcia’s empirical operationalization of Erikson’s concept of personal identity, and the several neo-Eriksonian identity models that have been introduced more recently. Marcia’s theoretical perspective, as well as each of the additional and more recent models, represented an attempt to expand on a specific aspect of Erikson (most notably on his four angles of identity). Thus, a comprehensive, multidimensional, and precise understanding of identity should include elements of all of these theoretical views.

Freud, Erikson, and Marcia: The Fundamentals of Identity Theory

Freud (1930/1965) was one of the first psychological theorists to address the fundamental question of self-definition. Freud believed that one’s sense of self was de-
rived from parental introjects during the genesis of the superego, at the end of the Oedipal conflict. Furthermore, not only did Freud believe that these introjects formed the foundation of one’s self-definition during childhood, but he also held that these parental identifications were not significantly revised or updated during adolescence or adulthood. More or less, then, one’s self-concept was believed to be a function of the basic identificatory processes occurring during the preschool years.

Although Freud (1923/1961) wrote extensively on identification and other identity-like processes, the first psychodynamic writings to move identity formation beyond childhood identifications and parental introjects were those of Erikson (1950) in his classic work *Childhood and Society*. Erikson believed that it is the presence of self-selected identity elements that separates children from adolescents and adults. Simply put, “the consolidation of identity marks the end of childhood” (Marcia, 1993a, p. 3).

For Erikson, identity is best represented by a single bipolar dimension, ranging from the ego syntonic pole of identity synthesis to the ego dystonic pole of identity confusion. *Identity synthesis* represents a reworking of childhood and contemporaneous identifications into a larger, self-determined set of self-identified ideals, whereas *identity confusion* represents an inability to develop a workable set of ideals on which to base an adult identity. Ego identity, then, represents a coherent picture that one shows both to oneself and to the outside world. Career, romantic preferences, religious ideology, and political preferences, among other facets, come together to form the mosaic that represents who one is. The more complete and consistent that mosaic is, the closer to ego identity synthesis one is, whereas the more disjointed and incomplete the picture is, the more ego identity confusion one will manifest.

All individuals, at any time during their lives, can be placed at some point on Erikson’s dimension between identity synthesis and identity confusion. To facilitate healthy functioning, self-knowledge should predominate over confusion. The individual still possesses enough self-knowledge to survive in the late modern era and to make consistent and useful choices (i.e., personal and social aspects of identity). On the other hand, the individual should be clear that there are aspects of him- or herself of which he or she is not consciously aware (i.e., the most fundamental aspects of his or her identity). Some facets of identity are unconscious, representing intrapsychic conflicts between the ego and the id and superego (Erikson, 1974, 1980). It follows, then, that the optimal placement along this axis is said to be near the midpoint but slightly closer to identity synthesis (Erikson, 1950, 1968).

In more concrete terms, identity synthesis represents a sense of “a present with an anticipated future” (Erikson, 1968, p. 30). It is evident in people such as Mahatma Gandhi, who seem imbued with an unmistakable sense of purpose in their lives (Erikson, 1969). There is a sense of continuity of character that appears to hold the synthesized person together (Erikson, 1950, 1982). An identity-synthe-
sized person’s choices and actions are consistent with one another, such that one can predict, with some degree of certainty, what that person is going to decide or do in the context of any particular situation or life choice.

At the other end of the identity dimension, Erikson (1968) posited identity confusion as somewhat of a continuum, “with ‘mild’ confusion at one end . . . and ‘aggravated’ confusion at the other” (p. 212). Identity confusion can represent conditions ranging from not knowing what university to attend to feeling as though one’s life is completely lacking in purpose. As an illustration of the more aggravated form of identity confusion, Erikson used Biff Loman, from the Arthur Miller (1958) play Death of a Salesman, who complains that he “just can’t take hold of some kind of a life” (p. 54). A less severe example of identity confusion might be the college student who is not sure what to major in or the doctor’s son who is not quite sure if he truly wants to follow in his father’s footsteps.

Erikson (1980) delineated four angles from which ego identity can be observed. These angles represent forms or angles that identity takes in varying situations and at different points during one’s life:

At one time, then, [identity] will appear to refer to a conscious sense of individual identity; at another to an unconscious striving for a continuity of personal character; at a third, as a criterion for the silent doings of ego synthesis; and finally, as a maintenance of an inner solidarity with a group’s ideals and identity. (Erikson, 1980, pp. 109–110, italics added)

Erikson (1974, 1980) organized his four angles of identity into three levels according to each angle’s degree of embeddedness in self and context. As the most fundamental level, Erikson postulated ego identity as ego synthesis and continuity of personal character. Under the heading of ego identity, Erikson placed one’s most basic and fundamental beliefs about oneself that would be extremely private, if not unconscious, and that might represent intrapsychic conflicts that have been internalized from parents and carried over from childhood. As a composite of fundamental beliefs, ego identity was postulated to be temporally consistent and resistant to change (Erikson, 1974).

At the intersection of self and context, Erikson spoke of personal identity as the set of goals, values, and beliefs that one shows to the world. Personal identity includes career goals, dating preferences, word choices, and other aspects of self that identify an individual as someone in particular and that help to distinguish him or her from other people.

As the most contextually oriented level, social identity was identified as a sense of inner solidarity with a group’s ideals, the consolidation of elements that have been integrated into one’s sense of self from groups to which one belongs. Social identity has sometimes been described as group identity in the social psychological literature (e.g., Côté, 1996b; Weigert, Teitge, & Teitge, 1986). Aspects of self such as native language, country of origin, and racial background would fall under the heading of group identity.
Erikson’s concept of identity is multidimensional and extensive in its scope and coverage. Erikson spoke of cognitive, moral, social, and cultural aspects of identity, among many others. Indeed, it is likely that Erikson’s mission was to establish a developmental–social approach encompassing all levels of self, from the most intrapsychic ego conflicts to the individual’s embeddedness in a cultural and historical context (Côté, 1993).

However, there is a basic lack of theoretical precision that seems to pervade Erikson’s writings (Côté & Levine, 1987). His writings were rich in clinical and metaphorical description but lacking in rigor and detail. Erikson (1950) himself noted that “at times, the reader will find me painting contexts and backgrounds where he would rather have me point to facts and concepts” (p. 16). The result was a theory that was eloquent and artistic but from which operational definitions were difficult to extract (Côté, 1984).

A number of individuals have attempted to extract operational definitions and to derive testable models and hypotheses from Erikson’s writings. The work of Marcia (1966, 1980) was the first neo-Eriksonian identity model to stimulate a significant research literature. Focusing on personal identity, Marcia constructed a status typology intended to represent Erikson’s theory. Marcia’s work has inspired more than 300 theoretical and empirical publications (Marcia, 1993a).

The Identity Status Construct

Marcia (1980, 1988) extrapolated from Erikson’s writing the assumedly independent dimensions of exploration and commitment. Exploration can be defined as “problem-solving behavior aimed at eliciting information about oneself or one’s environment in order to make a decision about an important life choice” (Grotevant, 1987, p. 204). Commitment represents the adherence to a specific set of goals, values, and beliefs (Marcia, 1988). Thus, exploration is the sorting through of multiple alternatives, whereas commitment is the act of choosing one or more alternatives and following through with them. Because commitment represents the adoption of a set of ideals, it can be said to imbue the individual with a sense of fidelity, or purpose and continuity (Marcia, 1980). This sense of fidelity may alleviate the uncertainty and disorientation that accompany identity confusion (Erikson, 1964).

By bifurcating both exploration and commitment into high and low levels and juxtaposing each level of one with each level of the other, Marcia (1966) derived four independent identity statuses. These are identity diffusion, identity foreclosure, identity moratorium, and identity achievement. Each status represents a combination of a level of exploration with a level of commitment. Taken together, the statuses comprise a 2 by 2 grid, with exploration as the x axis and commitment as the y axis (or vice versa). Statuses that are adjacent to one another in the grid share one dimension in common (e.g., foreclosure and achievement are both high in
commitment). Statuses positioned diagonally across from one another are opposite on both dimensions and might be considered theoretical antitheses (e.g., foreclosure represents low levels of exploration and high levels of commitment, whereas moratorium represents high levels of exploration and low levels of commitment; Schwartz & Dunham, 2000).

The identity statuses appear to be better characterized as character types than as developmental stages (Côté & Levine, 1988; Grotevant, 1986; Meeus, Iedema, Helsen, & Vollebergh, 1999; van Hoof, 1999). Each status has been associated with a distinct set of personality characteristics (for a more extensive review, see Marcia, 1980, 1993a), but there is no clearly established developmental sequencing of statuses (Waterman, 1982). Until further research has clarified the developmental utility of identity status, it will continue to be more useful as a character typology than as a developmental model (Meeus et al., 1999).

Identity achievement symbolizes a commitment enacted following a period of exploration. Marcia (1966) originally considered the achieved status to be the endpoint of the identity formation process. Achievement is often thought of as the most mature status because it is associated with balanced thinking (Boyes & Chandler, 1992), effective decision making (Marcia, 1993a), and deep interpersonal relationships (Craig-Bray, Adams, & Dobson, 1988; Orlofsky, Marcia, & Lesser, 1973). The achieved individual is one who has gone through the identity search and has selected one or more elements from which to adhere. Accordingly, such individuals have done the most identity work of all the statuses (cf. Grotevant, 1987).

Identity moratorium is the state of active exploration in the relative absence of commitment. The moratorium status may be associated with storm and stress (Kidwell, Dunham, Bacho, Pastorino, & Portes, 1995), and as a consequence, individuals tend to remain in moratorium for comparatively less time than in any of the other statuses (Meeus, 1992). Moratorium is also most associated with indices of critical thinking, particularly the generation of multiple alternatives when one is faced with an important life choice (Berman, Schwartz, Kurtines, & Berman, in press). Therefore, moratorium individuals are among the most open-minded and thoughtful of the identity statuses, continuing to sort through alternatives even as the uncertainty of this search becomes increasingly acute.

Identity foreclosure is the state of having made commitments to a set of goals, values, and beliefs in the relative absence of prior exploration. Generally, foreclosure is associated with some degree of closed-mindedness, smug self-satisfaction, and rigidity (Marcia, 1980). Foreclosed individuals tend to be somewhat authoritarian (Marcia, 1967) and to report relatively conflict-free, idealized relationships with their parents (Adams, Dyk, & Bennion, 1987; Jackson, Dunham, & Kidwell, 1990). Foreclosed individuals tend to become increasingly attached to their current circumstances and to the individuals who have helped to put those circumstances in place, and they tend to resist change at almost any cost. This reliance on current circumstances creates somewhat of a security blanket. Marcia (1994, 1995) point-
ed out that, when this security blanket is removed, foreclosed individuals often go into crisis, not knowing what to do without being able to rely on the norms, rules, and situations to which they have become accustomed.

As Archer and Waterman (1990) described, foreclosure has many faces. Foreclosure can be the medical student who comes from three generations of doctors, the young man who steps into the family business just as soon as his father is ready to retire, or the Army drill sergeant who angrily reprimands recruits in the same manner he endured during his own training. In any case, foreclosed individuals uncritically adopt someone else’s standards, rules, career choices, religious beliefs, and so forth without first examining or questioning these ideals.

Identity diffusion is the apathetic state that represents the relative lack of both exploration and commitment. Diffused individuals are generally apathetic and disinterested (Marcia, 1980) and are often at risk for a number of maladaptive outcomes, including academic (Berzonsky, 1985) and drug (Jones, 1992) problems. They also tend to be overly affected by situational variations (Schwartz, Mullis, & Dunham, 1998). Diffusion also appears to share many personality characteristics with bulimia (Auslander & Dunham, 1996), including emotional distance from one’s family of origin (Adams et al., 1987; Jackson et al., 1990) and poor interpersonal skills. In general terms, diffusion is a lack of any sort of basic identity structure that might hold the person together and afford him or her a solid basis for making choices and following a consistent life path. Many diffused individuals become drifters or low-functioning individuals who seem to waste many of the opportunities presented to them.

Diffused individuals are generally lacking in social support (Meeus & Deković, 1995), and a significant percentage of them are likely to be depressed (Marcia, 1993a). Diffusion is often manifested as the bright high school student who continues to fail his classes because he does not finish his homework, or as the 30-year-old who still lives at home with her parents and cannot keep a job.

Identity Domains. The identity statuses are assumed to describe individuals both at the overall personality level and within any number of content areas known as domains (Grotevant, 1993; Waterman, 1985). It is assumed that identity may operate differently across domains and differently within individual domains than at the overall level (Grotevant, 1993). Each theorist has selected some set of domains that he or she considers relevant. Erikson (1950) first pinpointed identity problems in the areas of occupational choice and ideological commitments. Marcia (1966) retained the occupational domain and redefined ideology as religion and politics.

Some 15 years after Marcia’s (1966) original publication, identity status theory was extended into interpersonal domains (Grotevant, Thorbecke, & Meyer, 1982), with the previously existing domains classified under the heading of ideological. The domains introduced under the heading of interpersonal were friendships, dating, and sex roles (Grotevant & Cooper, 1981). Additional content domains (e.g.,
values, philosophical lifestyle, recreation, and family) have since been integrated into identity status theory and measures (e.g., Balistreri, Busch-Rossnagel, & Geisinger, 1995; Bennion & Adams, 1986).

More recently, an alternative organization of identity domains was introduced, with domain clusters progressing from the person outward (Kurtines, 1999) or from society inward (Côté, 1996b). Three domain clusters were identified, in accordance with the levels of analysis addressed in the social psychological literature (i.e., psychological, interactional, and social–structural; Côté, 1996a). The psychological domain cluster contains intrapersonal content areas such as career choice and sense of self. The interactional domain cluster contains interpersonal content areas such as friendships and dating. The social–structural domain cluster societally oriented contains content areas such as politics and morality. For this exercise, the classic bifurcation of identity domains will be called the dichotomous technique, whereas the technique for the clustering of domains according to the level of analysis to which they correspond will be called the hierarchical domain clustering technique.

A slight reconceptualization of the hierarchical clustering method is offered in this article, drawing on Erikson’s three levels of identity. The psychological, interactional, and social–structural domain clusters will be referred to here as ego–personal, personal–social, and social–structural, respectively. The combinations of Eriksonian levels of analysis into single clusters are utilized to reflect the fact that neo-Eriksonian theories of identity often do not focus neatly on only one of Erikson’s levels. Clearly, it would be difficult to argue that any neo-Eriksonian theory focuses exclusively on ego identity. Those models that focus on personal identity tend to incorporate aspects of ego or social identity as well. Moreover, models oriented principally toward social identity often point to structural aspects of society and culture in which social identity is embedded, hence, the term social–structural.

The issue of how domains should be clustered is both a theoretical and empirical one. The dichotomous domain clustering technique was an artifact of the interpersonal content areas that were introduced to complement the three ideological domains originally introduced by Marcia (for a discussion of the theoretical bases of the dichotomous technique, see Archer, 1993). The hierarchical clustering technique, however, is theoretically derived and may be more consistent with the theoretical basis of Erikson’s model. That is, Erikson conceived of lifespan development as occurring at the interface of self and society. The hierarchical domain clustering technique, with one cluster within the self, one cluster outside the self (i.e., within society), and one cluster at the intersection of self and other, makes more theoretical sense in the context of Erikson’s basic psychosocial premise than does the dichotomous technique, which simply bifurcates domains into those that significantly involve other people and those that do not.

The domains that have been identified by various theorists are by no means exhaustive and represent only a sampling of the possible array of domains that can be
assumed to comprise overall identity. Furthermore, even those domains that have been identified can be broken down further. For instance, sex roles can be divided into husband and wife roles, sex roles in the workplace, and son and daughter roles (e.g., Graham, Sorell, & Montgomery, 1999). The domains surveyed in past and current identity research are simply those that have been specifically identified by theorists and researchers in the field. Much work has yet to be done in the area of identifying and measuring identity domains.

Recently, some scholars have added ethnic identity as an additional ego-personal domain for ethnic and racial minority individuals (for a review, see Phinney & Rosenthal, 1992). For those who are not members of the majority cultural group, such as people who are Black, Hispanic, or Asian in the United States and Canada, defining oneself in relation to both one’s own ethnic group and the majority-oriented culture becomes an additional aspect of identity formation. Minority individuals must choose whether to identify primarily with their ethnic subculture, adopt the values of the majority culture, or become bicultural (i.e., internalize aspects of both the minority subculture and the majority culture; Phinney, 1990).

Depending on how they are conceptualized, domains stand at varying degrees of independence from one another. For instance, research using the traditional ideological–interpersonal dichotomy of domains has demonstrated that the ideological and interpersonal domains are highly interrelated (e.g., occupation and intimate relationships, Archer, 1989a, 1993; religion and sex roles, Schwartz, 1996). However, within the hierarchical framework, the three domain clusters have been found to be more independent (Côté, 1996a, 1996b). Even within the hierarchical domain framework, there are still significant interrelationships among domains from different clusters. For example, even though domains such as career choice and sense of self are generally classified as intrapersonal (Archer, 1993) or psychological (Côté, 1993, 1996a), identity within those domains is constructed within a social and relational context (Adams & Marshall, 1996; Kroger, 1989; Marcia, 1993b). However, the domains within each cluster are considered to be more interrelated than are those domains between clusters (e.g., politics and religion are more interrelated than are politics and dating).

**Measurement in Identity Status Theory**

From the objectivist point of view that characterizes the current model of scientific inquiry, knowledge development in any field of study, beyond pure theoretical speculation, is dependent on sound and reliable measurement techniques. The ability of an empirical study to generate findings that are both theoretically and practically useful depends on the ability of the measures used to adequately tap the constructs being studied. Survey measures, in particular, are vulnerable to multiple sources of error such as social desirability, false and invalid responding, and participant effects (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991). Because identity research is largely dependent on questionnaires and structured interviews, it is crucial that careful at-
tention is paid to the potentially biasing effects that measurement techniques (e.g., format, medium, etc.) can exert on the resulting data (Schwartz et al., 1998). Even within a given format and medium, such as paper-and-pencil questionnaires, different identity measures utilize differing methods of obtaining responses (e.g., 6-point vs. 5-point Likert scales, targeting exploration and commitment vs. targeting each status directly, etc.) and target different domains.

Although conceptual advances in identity status theory began almost immediately after Marcia (1966) first published the model, progress in measurement has lagged significantly behind. Two principal types of identity measures have been used: structured interviews and Likert-scale questionnaires. Although some degree of convergence has been found between the two types of measures (Balistreri et al., 1995; Bennion, 1988; Craig-Bray & Adams, 1986), different identity instruments often yield incompatible identity status classifications in one fourth or more of the participants surveyed (Berzonsky & Adams, 1999; Schwartz, 1997). Additionally, because different identity instruments generally survey different domains, convergent validity can be ascertained only in terms of overall identity status (or, in some cases, ideological and interpersonal identity status). At present, identity measures have not been standardized in any way that would facilitate comparisons across instruments (cf. van Hoof, 1999).

The first identity measures were the Incomplete Sentences Blank and the Identity Status Interview, introduced by Marcia (1966) as part of his publication introducing the statuses. The measure assessed identity status in the areas of politics, religion, and occupation. Raters scored each sentence completion according to the status to which it seemed most similar. The most frequently assigned status from the incomplete sentences became the participant’s classification. Similar procedures were used in the scoring of interview responses.

When identity status theory was extended into the interpersonal domains (Grotevant et al., 1982), a new measure, the Ego Identity Interview (Grotevant & Cooper, 1981), was introduced into the identity literature. The Ego Identity Interview assessed identity status in the three ideological domains used in Marcia’s Incomplete Sentences Blank and Identity Status Interview (politics, religion, and occupation) and in the three interpersonal domains introduced by Grotevant et al. (friendships, dating, and sex roles). Statuses were assigned according to whether the participant had been scored as high or low on exploration and commitment.

Although the Ego Identity Interview and its successor, a revised version of the Identity Status Interview (Marcia & Archer, 1993), have been useful in conducting in-depth narrative studies of small samples (Grotevant, 1993), they are not suited for the mass sampling techniques used by many researchers in the social psychological field. To address this issue, Adams and colleagues (Adams, Bennion, & Huh, 1989; Adams, Shea, & Fitch, 1979; Bennion & Adams, 1986; Grotevant & Adams, 1984) developed a series of objective, Likert-scale measures assessing identity status. The most recent of these measures, the Extended Objective Measure of Ego Identity Status II (EOM–EIS–II; Adams et al., 1989), targets iden-
tity status within four ideological domains (politics, religion, occupation, and philosophical lifestyle) and four interpersonal domains (friendships, dating, sex roles, and recreation).

In contrast to the EOM–EIS–II, which provides direct measures of identity status, Balistreri et al. (1995) developed the Ego Identity Process Questionnaire (EIPQ) to measure exploration and commitment. Status assignments for the EIPQ are obtained by way of median splits on the exploration and commitment scores. Status assignments are made according to the definitions of the statuses.

There have been other paper-and-pencil measures of identity status as well. Dellas and Jernigan (1987) constructed the Dellas Identity Status Inventory, which is widely used for assessment of ideological identity status. Similar to the EIPQ, the Dellas Identity Status Inventory provides continuous measures of exploration and commitment within the domains of occupation, religion, and politics.

Bosma (1985, 1992) created the Groningen Identity Development Scale, a Dutch-language measure of exploration and commitment. The Groningen Identity Development Scale is an interview based measure assessing exploration and commitment in several ideological and interpersonal content areas (i.e., philosophy of life, school or future occupation, personal characteristics, parents, friendships, and intimate relationships).

Only one measure of identity status has been explicitly derived from the hierarchical clustering technique. Wanderman and Kurtines (1994) designed the Identity Domain Scale to assess identity status as well as satisfaction and distress concerning ego, personal, and social identity. The Identity Domain Scale focuses primarily on satisfaction and distress and only secondarily on identity status, which is assessed by way of dichotomous (yes or no) items for exploration and commitment in each domain. Most studies using the Identity Domain Scale have utilized the measure to assess only satisfaction and distress, whereas using the EOM–EIS–II or EIPQ to provide identity status classifications (e.g., Berman, 1998; Ferrer-Wreder et al., in press). Thus, the Identity Domain Scale can be considered a first attempt toward designing an identity measure using the hierarchical method of domain organization.

On the whole, it appears that the various measures of personal identity have been designed using differing criteria and core assumptions about identity processes. In some cases, these divergent criteria and assumptions have led to compromised levels of convergent validity, whereas in other cases they have not. Objective measures of identity, such as the EOM–EIS–II, have generated acceptable levels of convergent validity with interview measures (e.g., Craig-Bray & Adams, 1986) but only when the individuals coding the interviews were functioning at the highest psychosocial levels (Berzonsky & Adams, 1999). Moreover, when objective measures such as the EOM–EIS–II and EIPQ have been compared with one another, convergent validity has been less than acceptable (Schwartz, 1997).

The lower-than-expected convergent validity of status assignment measures may lead to one, or both, of two conclusions. The first conclusion involves method-
ological concerns, and the second conclusion is theoretically oriented. It is likely
that these methodological and theoretical issues interact to produce differences in
status assignments among identity status instruments.

Methodologically speaking, several variations may contribute to incompatibili-
ties among identity status instruments. First, the measures may be incompatible in
terms of the wording of items or questions; interview measures provide open-end-
ed questions that allow the respondent to provide as much information as he or she
chooses, whereas objective measures force participants to rate themselves in rela-
tion to specific criteria. Second, the presence of different domains within the ideo-
logical and interpersonal domain clusters between measures may alter the compo-
sition of the resulting overall identity status scores. Third, the various measures of
identity status employ different status assignment techniques (e.g., median splits,
standardization techniques, and subjective judgments). Fourth, some identity mea-
sures assess exploration and commitment together (i.e., in the form of direct status
measures), whereas others assess each dimension separately.

Theoretically speaking, there may be nuances in the statuses that are not cap-
tured by the simple combination of exploration and commitment. Archer and
Waterman (1990), for instance, spoke of six subcategories of diffusion and seven
of foreclosure. Assumedly, each subcategory of diffusion involves low levels of
both exploration and commitment, and each subcategory of foreclosure involves a
low level of exploration coupled with a high level of commitment. However, the
subcategories differ greatly in their origins and personality characteristics. Closed
foreclosure, for instance, implies a militaristic adherence to one’s goals, values, and
beliefs and violent resistance to any attempts to change those ideals, whereas pre-
mature foreclosure is the much more benign state of being committed to childhood
ideals that have yet to be questioned. It is clear from this example that the simple
combination of low exploration and high commitment is not enough to capture the
subtleties of the foreclosed status.

Other measurement issues in identity status research remain to be addressed as
well. For example, the effects of specific methodological variations on identity
measurement have been sparsely studied. Schwartz et al. (1998) administered the
EIPQ to one sample of university students in paper-and-pencil form and to a sec-
ond sample with nearly identical demographic characteristics in computerized
form. There were significantly more diffused participants in the paper-and-pencil
sample and significantly more foreclosed participants in the computer-adminis-
tered sample. There was no such effect on the moratorium and achieved statuses.
Thus, even with individual-difference variability taken into account, the differ-
cences in identity status frequency distributions between samples suggests an effect
of testing medium, particularly on participants in the nonexploring statuses (diffu-
sion and foreclosure).

Other methodological variations in identity research may also have effects on
the resulting data. For instance, within the paper-and-pencil testing medium, some
researchers administer surveys in class, whereas others summon students to their laboratories or send students home to complete questionnaires. The effects of such seemingly insignificant variations on the data obtained have not been systematically studied. Most identity researchers have simply taken their methodology for granted and have examined the data without reference to methodological concerns. However, if identity measurement is to catch up with the progress of identity theory and research (and if the internal validity of identity research is to be assured), such studies will need to be conducted.

Clearly, in the area of identity measurement, much work remains to be done. Although Likert-scale measures such as the EIPQ and the EOM–EIS–II may be, to some extent, considered more useful research tools than Marcia’s (1966) original interview measure, even these instruments are imprecise. There is always the compromise that must be made between brevity and depth; that is, brief Likert-scale measures can be easily administered to hundreds of participants at a time, but the depth of information gathered on each participant is quite limited, and these samples are often nonrandom (cf. Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991). On the other hand, interview measures provide extensive narrative data (Grotevant, 1993), but testing more than a handful of people is cumbersome and impractical. Thus far, no one has proposed an integrative solution to this dilemma.

Extensions and Expansions of Identity Status Theory

The first 20 years or so of identity research revolved around establishing measures (Adams et al., 1979; Bennion & Adams, 1986; Grotevant & Cooper, 1981), construct validity (Berzonsky & Adams, 1999; Waterman, 1988), and correlates (e.g., personality characteristics, Marcia, 1980; family system antecedents, Grotevant & Cooper, 1986) of the identity status model. Those 20 years of research established the usefulness and versatility of the identity status model (Marcia, 1993a, 1994, 1995). However, Marcia (1966, 1993a) himself admitted that the identity statuses deviated from Erikson’s construct of identity and that the model focused primarily on personal identity. The viability of the identity status model as a developmental theory has also been questioned (Côté & Levine, 1988; Meeus, 1996; Meeus et al., 1999; Waterman, 1982, 1988).

Some writers (e.g., Côté & Levine, 1988; van Hoof, 1999) have openly suggested that the identity status model underrepresented Erikson’s concept of personal identity, particularly with respect to the many dimensions in which Erikson proposed the concept (e.g., value orientations and psychosocial moratoria; Côté & Levine, 1987) and the levels of identity that were not included in Marcia’s status model (i.e., ego and social identity; van Hoof, 1999). More specific weaknesses in the identity status model, as addressed by these authors, include cross-cultural validity, the failure of the four statuses to differentially relate to comparison variables, and the use of discrete status categories to represent identity. Both van Hoof and
Côté and Levine construed identity status as an excessively narrow conceptualization of identity, similar to Archer’s (1992) comment on the reduction of the richness and depth of a 1-hour identity interview to a single status assignment.

Accordingly, Côté and Levine (1988) and van Hoof (1999) called for the extension and expansion of neo-Eriksonian identity theory beyond the constraints of identity status. Their call has led the identity community to place increased importance on making neo-Eriksonian theory more faithful to Erikson’s original writings (e.g., Adams, 1997; Côté & Levine, 1987; Grotevant, 1987, 1992; Meeus et al., 1999). Consequently, a number of alternative identity models have begun to emerge since 1987. These models, all of which have drawn on the identity statuses in one way or another, have been advanced primarily to examine or extend portions of the Marcia paradigm in greater detail or to expand on the identity construct in ways that go far beyond the original four-status model. These alternative models have emerged from philosophical traditions as diverse as social constructivism, humanism, pragmatism, and symbolic interactionism.

Some of these alternative models have been put forth to examine individual differences in identity development, to make the identity construct more amenable to intervention, or to study additional factors that may contribute to the formation of an identity. At least six prominent such models have been created since 1987, and all of them have been at least partially validated against the Marcia paradigm. Like identity status, each alternative model highlights Erikson’s concept of personal identity. Each of these models also draws on one of the other levels of identity proposed by Erikson.

The introduction of the alternative models has had the effect of addressing some of the weaknesses in identity status theory highlighted by Côté and Levine (1988) and van Hoof (1999). Take, for example, the issue of cross-cultural validity. Kurtines (1999) introduced a set of identity-related skills and orientations that would help individuals interact successfully with society. These skills have been employed in cultural contexts as diverse as the United States and Brazil. Young people in both contexts benefitted equally from the acquisition and use of these skills (Ferrer-Wreder et al., in press; Milnitsky-Sapiro, Ferrer-Wreder, Cass-Lorente, Kurtines, & Briones, 2000).

Another issue addressed by the alternative models includes continuity of personal character, which identity status does not incorporate (cf. Côté & Levine, 1988). Berzonsky (1989), for instance, formulated an individual-differences process perspective that focuses on an individual’s characteristic approach to decision making and problem solving. These orientations tend to be stable over time (Berzonsky, 1990), even over the course of interventions that affect other identity variables (Schwartz, 2000).

Finally, the alternative models address ego and social identity—levels that were not incorporated into Marcia’s paradigm. Identity control theory, for example, incorporates ego identity by way of the moment-to-moment task of forming and revising an identity. It also focuses on the interpersonal and intrapsychic mechanisms
responsible for identity change. Côté (1996b), as another example, highlighted the cultural and historical contexts in which personal and social identity are embedded.

For the purposes of this explication, the alternative identity models are divided into two groups: extensions and expansions. Extensions are defined as models that largely complement identity status theory rather than diverging from it or reconceptualizing it. Extension models have generally been devised to examine a specific facet of identity status or to add a singular component to the status framework. For instance, Grotevant (1987) developed a model that conceptualized identity exploration as a function of two primary characteristics (abilities and orientations) and as being constrained or shaped by five antecedent and concurrent factors (information seeking, satisfaction, willingness to explore, expectations, and competing forces).

Expansions are models that may include identity status theory as a component but go far beyond Marcia’s formulation in their scope and coverage. Expansion models utilize the identity statuses but are generally more faithful to Erikson in conceptualizing identity as far more multidimensional than simply the intersection of exploration and commitment (cf. Côté & Levine, 1988). Expansion models generally include such components as group identity, social influences, cognitive underpinnings, societal evolution, and social responsibility in complementing and enlarging on the Marcia status matrix.

Using these definitions, extension models have been offered by Berzonsky (1989), Grotevant (1987; with extensions by Kerpelman, Pittman, & Lamke, 1997a, 1997b), and Waterman (1990), whereas expansion models have been offered by Kurtines (1999), Adams (Adams & Marshall, 1996), and Côté (1996b, 1997). Although each of these models stands at some degree of distance from Marcia’s original conceptualization, Adams, Côté, and Kurtines, as expansion models, can be considered more removed from Marcia than Berzonsky, Grotevant, and Waterman, who have, in some way, added to the statuses more than they have deviated from them.


On the other hand, the expansion models overlap considerably, and it would be nearly impossible to describe any of them without making reference to the others. All of the expansion models focus on both personal and social identity (and on the interaction between the two), although each model differs from the others in terms of the extent to which it highlights each level of identity. Kurtines (1999) focused primarily on personal identity and framed it within a social and cultural context (e.g., responsibility and critical thinking as socially valuable attributes). Adams (Adams & Marshall, 1996) assigned equal weight to personal and social identity, postulating that elements of each type of identity are incorporated by different
means. Côté (1996b, 1997) focused principally on social identity and viewed personal identity as a means for negotiating for social resources.

For example, Adams, Côté, and Kurtines all offer similar and complementary reasons for the marginalization of certain groups from the mainstream society to which they belong. When articulating Kurtines’s description of socially marginalized individuals as lacking in personal responsibility and critical thinking skills, for instance, it is natural to speak of these individuals’ deficits as resulting from excessive differentiation from social ideals (i.e., Adams) and disenfranchisement from conventional social institutions (i.e., Côté). For reasons such as this, each section articulating one of the expansion models includes intertranslations with the other two. If one’s goal is to offer an integrative viewpoint, it is important to establish conceptual linkages among the three expansion models and to highlight ways in which each of them views the same issues from a different perspective.

Extensions of Identity Status Theory

**Berzonsky: The Identity Style Model.** Whereas the identity statuses are generally seen as places rather than as developmental mechanisms (Berzonsky, 1990), Berzonsky (1989) formulated what he called a true process model of personal identity development. To study consistency and individual differences in identity formation, Berzonsky postulated three distinct identity styles. An identity style represents a problem-solving strategy or coping mechanism. Whereas identity status assignments are based on actions one has taken in the past, identity style classifications focus on one’s present method of handling daily situations.

Berzonsky’s identity styles denoted the ways in which individuals approach the decision-making process, especially concerning those decisions that have a significant impact on their personal identities and life paths. Berzonsky (1990) explicitly noted that all psychologically healthy individuals should be capable of utilizing any of the three styles during adolescence and adulthood. The identity style orientation that individuals adopt tends to be stable and resistant to change. Thus, it stands to reason that identity style is a characteristic rather than a skill and that the style that one characteristically displays is a chosen preference, as opposed to an acquired competence.

Berzonsky (1990) stated that personal identity is constructed by means of social interactions. The identity style model draws on the personal construct theory of Kelly (1955). People are viewed as self-theorists who create working models of the world around them (Berzonsky, 1993a). As scientists, individuals are actively able to choose (from among the three identity styles) the one that best appears to suit them.

The seemingly most adaptive identity style is the informational style. The informational style incorporates information seeking and problem-focused coping (Berzonsky, 1992), active exploration (Schwartz, 1996), flexible commitment
(Berzonsky & Neimeyer, 1994), need for cognition (Berzonsky, 1993b), and high levels of self-esteem (Nurmi, Berzonsky, Tammi, & Kinney, 1997). Because of its emphasis on exploration, the informational style appears to underlie the moratorium and achievement statuses (Berzonsky, 1989).

The informational style might be observed in the graduating senior who carefully investigates several possible universities before applying for admission. It might also be seen in the father who examines and compares six school districts before moving his family into a new house. It would also be evidenced in the teacher who selects a new textbook because the one she used last year was not appropriate for her class.

The normative style represents imitation and conformity. It involves a closed-minded approach (Berzonsky, 1993b), rigid and dogmatic commitment (Berzonsky & Neimeyer, 1994), stable self-conceptions (Nurmi et al., 1997), and the suppression of exploration (Schwartz, 1996). Because of its closed-mindedness and rigidity, the normative style corresponds most closely to the foreclosed status, although it is also somewhat associated with achievement (Berzonsky, 1989). When they are faced with important decisions, normative individuals tend to seek the counsel of authority figures and significant others—very often the same authority figures and significant others on whose standards the normative individual has based his or her self-conceptions. In this way, persons utilizing the normative style can avoid having to deal with information that conflicts with their self-conceptions, and they can resist change for as long as possible.

One might see the normative style in the college student who consults her mother and adheres strictly to the mother’s advice whenever she must make any important decision. This style is also evident in the accountant who refuses to upgrade to a new version of his tax software because he is too comfortable with the existing one. It is apparent in the doctor who learns her trade by watching her mentor and copying his techniques. In any case, the normative style involves passive copying of external standards and strong resistance toward any attempt to change those standards.

Last, the diffuse–avoidant style symbolizes procrastination and evasive action. It is best characterized as a situation-by-situation approach to life and involves an emotion-focused coping strategy (Berzonsky, 1992, 1993a). The diffuse–avoidant style is associated with low levels of commitment (Berzonsky, 1993b; Berzonsky & Neimeyer, 1994) as well as low self-esteem and unstable self-conceptions (Nurmi et al., 1997). This identity style appears to underlie the diffused status (Berzonsky, 1989). Diffuse–avoidant individuals generally pay little attention to their future or to the long-term consequences of their choices. They tend to be non-committal in terms of identity alternatives, latching onto something only when external circumstances dictate that they should (Berzonsky, 1993a; Schwartz et al., 1998). Diffuse–avoidant people do engage in some form of exploration, but this exploration is disorganized and haphazard (Berman et al., in press).
The diffuse–avoidant style might characterize someone who waits to pay bills until the creditors threaten to take legal action. University students who write their term papers the night before the deadline would also be diffuse–avoidant. Likewise, a man who endlessly plays the field, refusing to make a romantic commitment, would be using the diffuse–avoidant style.

Taken together, the three identity styles add a process component to Marcia’s identity status framework (Berzonsky, 1990; Berzonsky & Adams, 1999). Identity style, as a customary way of addressing (or not addressing) life issues, transforms the formation of personal identity from a static, one-time event—as Marcia originally conceptualized it—into a dynamic process of constructing and revising one’s sense of self, as Erikson (1968) intended it to be. Furthermore, whereas it is questionable whether the identity status approach is valid for use with adult populations (however, see Stephen et al., 1992; Waterman & Archer, 1990), the identity style model has been demonstrated to be effective with adults, including prison inmates (White & Jones, 1996; White, Wampler, & Winn, 1998) and recovering substance abusers (White, Wampler, & Fischer, in press).

The combined use of the identity status and identity style approaches (as suggested by Berzonsky, 1990) reveals three patterns of decision making and problem solving (Berzonsky & Adams, 1999). One could argue that the informational style represents an achieved (or moratorium) way of making decisions, in that multiple alternatives are carefully explored and examined before one commits to any such alternative (and commitments that are made tend to be flexible and subject to revision). The normative style appears to represent a foreclosed way of making decisions, in that ambiguity is not tolerated and commitments are enacted as soon as possible (Berzonsky & Sullivan, 1992). Finally, it might be said that the diffuse–avoidant style implies a diffused way of making decisions. Diffuse–avoidant individuals proceed on a situation-by-situation basis and have no organized or consistent method for negotiating their way through life (Berzonsky, 1993a).

Accordingly, the terms informational identity, normative identity, and diffuse–avoidant identity might be coined to label the self-construction patterns characterized by the three identity styles (cf. Berzonsky & Neimeyer, 1988). Individuals utilizing the informational style would tend to create a coherent and revisable sense of self (informational identity). Likewise, those using the normative style would be expected to construct a rigid, inflexible, and immutable sense of self (normative identity), and those using the diffuse–avoidant style would generally construct a fragmented, haphazard, and piecemeal sense of self (diffuse–avoidant identity).

The informational identity would most likely be manifested as the moratorium and achieved statuses, the normative identity as the foreclosed status, and the diffuse–avoidant identity as the diffused status. The process perspective, however, is more indicative and reflective of continuing decision-making strategies than the
status approach (Berzonsky, 1990). Characterizing identity in terms of one’s typical problem-solving strategy (e.g., “I tend to sort through alternatives”) may be more faithful to Erikson’s dynamic view of identity than is characterizing identity in terms of past actions (e.g., “I have explored”).

Although Berzonsky focuses principally on personal identity, the dynamic and process oriented nature of his model may draw somewhat on the angle of ego identity. Identity style is postulated as more consistent and less ephemeral than identity status (Berzonsky, 1990), in that the style one characteristically utilizes is expected to be stable. In a study of university freshmen, Schwartz et al. (1998) found that identity style classifications were proportionally equal in paper-and-pencil and computerized testing situations, whereas identity status classifications differed significantly between modes of administration. Identity style classifications may also be relatively stable across cultural contexts (Schwartz, Berman, Portes, Berman, & Briones, 2001), whereas identity status has been shown to vary significantly among ethnic groups (Phinney & Rosenthal, 1992). Although these studies compared identity style classifications cross-sectionally, it is worth noting that identity style frequencies did not differ across variations (e.g., ethnicity or mode of administration) that produced significant differences in identity status distribution.

Identity style, then, may represent an increase in continuity of personal character over identity status—both across situations and across individuals. Given that the “silent doings of ego synthesis” (Erikson, 1980, p. 110) are assumed to reflect more of an ongoing process than a stationary event, the process orientation of Berzonsky’s approach may be more suited to capture Erikson’s ego synthesis angle. The greater degree of continuity inherent in identity style, then, might make this construct more faithful to Erikson’s notion of continuity of character than identity status has been shown to be. If one accepts the notion that identity style draws on both ego synthesis and continuity of personal character, it follows that Berzonsky’s model highlights ego as well as personal identity.

**Grotevant: Exploration as the Work of Identity Formation.** In some ways, Grotevant (1987) served as a predecessor to Berzonsky by calling for a process model of identity formation. Grotevant referred to exploration as “the work of the identity exploration process” (p. 204). By this, he meant that exploration was the process variable within Marcia’s identity status model, with commitment taking the role of an outcome index (Bosma, 1992). Given that he designated exploration as the process behind identity development, Grotevant’s focus was on identifying the components, antecedents, and concurrents of exploration.

Grotevant (1987) identified two principal components of identity exploration. He postulated that exploration was a function of “those abilities and orientations that individuals bring to bear on the identity formation process” (italics added, pp. 204–205). Abilities were construed to be skills, such as critical thinking, problem solving, perspective taking, and the like. Orientations referred to attitudinal factors
(e.g., rigidity and procrastination) that would affect one’s willingness or unwillingness to engage in the exploration process, given the uncertainties and stressors that accompany the process.

Grotevant assumed that abilities and orientations were independent components of exploration, that is, that the relative presence or absence of one would not be likely to determine the relative presence or absence of the other. Given this assumption, one could create a 2 by 2 matrix in which, for instance, the presence or absence of abilities would represent the x axis and the favorability or unfavorability of one’s orientations toward exploration would represent the y axis. The cell representing favorable orientations and the presence of critical skills would be most conducive to promoting exploration, with the cells representing only the presence of critical skills or favorable orientations being somewhat less conducive. Problem-solving skills and orientations toward exploration each make separate contributions to facilitating exploration, and both elements need to be present for the greatest amount of exploration to occur (Grotevant, 1987).

In addition to postulating two principal components of identity exploration, Grotevant (1987) identified five antecedents to the exploration process: (a) information-seeking tendency, (b) the presence or absence of competing forces in one’s life, (c) satisfaction or dissatisfaction with one’s current identity, (d) expectations for the exploration process, and (e) willingness to explore. Grotevant argued that each of these components contributes to one’s level of identity exploration. Taken together, they may predict the degree of exploration undertaken by a given individual.

It is important to note that, once exploration has begun, the antecedent factors continue to guide, affect, and even potentially stop the process (Kerpelman et al., 1997b). Following an initial period of exploration, individuals often stop to reflect on the process and decide how, or whether, to proceed with it. For example, if, following a brief period of exploration, one is satisfied with the identity that one has created, one is unlikely to continue exploring (Grotevant, 1992). Conversely, a continuing orientation toward exploration, in the absence of satisfaction with one’s current sense of identity, may result in further identity search, followed by further reevaluation at a later time. These reevaluations are crucial to the exploration process, as they represent updates and changes in the course of exploration as mandated by situational changes, individual growth, or other new information (Grotevant, 1987).

No empirical studies have been designed explicitly to test Grotevant’s model. However, empirical data on some of the model’s propositions have been gathered in the course of validating other alternative models. For example, Berzonsky and Kurtines both focused on cognitive underpinnings of the exploration process (Berman et al., in press). Berzonsky examined information seeking and orientation toward exploration as part of the identity style model. Kurtines examined the role of problem solving and critical thinking in the exploration process. Research vali-
dating these two models may also lend empirical support to Grotevant’s five proposed antecedents of exploration.

Information seeking, expectations, and willingness to explore would be expected to facilitate exploration, whereas satisfaction with one’s current identity and interfering factors would be expected to inhibit exploration. Gathering information was identified as an important component of exploration (Marcia, 1966, 1980; Waterman, 1982, 1993a). Berzonsky’s informational style, which is based on information seeking, has been found to be related to exploration (Schwartz, 1996).

It is theoretically plausible that expectations for the exploration process will affect the intensity and outcome of the process. A person who expects to resolve problems through exploration would likely have a better chance of doing so than someone who does not expect to resolve his or her issues. However, it remains for empirical studies to lend support to this proposition.

The willingness to explore has not been directly investigated as an antecedent to exploration. However, the unwillingness to explore, specifically Berzonsky’s normative style, was found to inhibit identity exploration (Schwartz, 1996), and use of the normative identity style was found to suppress the relation between problem-solving abilities and exploration (Berman et al., in press). If one examines these findings in an inverse way, the willingness to explore would be expected to facilitate exploration as well as the effects of problem-solving competence on exploration.

With respect to competing factors, a person who has a large number of current commitments is likely to be either foreclosed or achieved. Both the foreclosed and achieved statuses (i.e., those with significant levels of commitment) have been found to be less likely to engage in critical problem posing and solving than the diffused and moratorium statuses (Berman et al., in press). Foreclosed individuals are unlikely to explore in any context unless they are forced out of their comfort zone (Marcia, 1995). Achieved individuals, even though they tend to use the informational style, are unlikely to explore significantly due to lowered use of problem-solving abilities, in combination with the feeling that they have already found what they have been looking for (Marcia, 1994). This also indicates that once an individual has explored sufficiently to reach the achieved status, he or she will stop exploring (Grotevant, 1992).

With regard to indexes of satisfaction with one’s current identity, it has been shown that well-being (which may be construed as satisfaction with oneself) is highest in the committed statuses and lowest in the uncommitted statuses (Meeus & Deković, 1995). Moreover, psychological distress, which can be taken as the opposite of satisfaction and well-being, has been found to occur to a significantly lesser extent in the foreclosed and achieved statuses than in the diffused and moratorium statuses (Kidwell et al., 1995). In short, then, satisfaction and well-being appear to be associated with commitment and, as stated previously, are likely to inhibit exploration to some degree. If one is satisfied enough with one’s current iden-
tity, then further exploration would probably be deemed unnecessary. Furthermore, becoming satisfied with one’s identity through the course of exploration is often reason enough to stop the exploration process. If one is satisfied with whom one has become, where is the need to explore any further?

Extending Grotevant’s Process Model of Exploration: Identity Control Theory. Whereas Grotevant’s (1987) process model of identity specifies the elements that comprise and guide the exploration process and provide for repeated reevaluations of that process, it “does not specify proximal causes for continued exploration” (Kerpelman et al., 1997b, p. 333). Moreover, whereas the criteria for periodic reevaluations of exploration and the emerging identity are specified in Grotevant’s model, the particular occurrences that drive or inhibit exploration on a weekly, daily, or even hourly basis are not. Control theory (e.g., Powers, 1973), with its emphasis on reciprocal causation and mutual influence, was introduced into the identity literature to get at the microprocesses (i.e., singular interpersonal interactions and their intrapsychic consequences) that drive exploration and identity development (Kerpelman & Lamke, 1997; Kerpelman et al., 1997a, 1997b; Kerpelman & Smith, 1999). More specifically, the constant interactions between the adolescent’s developing identity and his or her social environment, and most particularly the congruence or incongruence between one’s ego, personal, or social identity and the feedback that one receives concerning those aspects of identity, are presumed to drive or inhibit the exploration process. If one’s view of oneself is consistent with the feedback that one receives, exploration is unlikely to occur. On the other hand, if the feedback that one receives from significant others is not in concert with the identity that one possesses, then revision of that identity (i.e., exploration) is likely to take place (cf. Dunham, Kidwell, & Wilson, 1986).

Grotevant (1997) endorsed this revision and extension of his process model, stating that the methodological and conceptual approaches being proposed should “move the field ahead” (p. 356). Berzonsky (1997) offered the addition of an individual differences component to identity control theory, which Kerpelman et al. (1997a) incorporated into a revised version of the model. Simply stated, informational individuals would be expected to be most open to feedback that is not consistent with their identities. Normative individuals should be closed to such feedback and seek out only feedback that is congruent with their identities (cf. Nurmi et al., 1997). Diffuse–avoidant individuals should be inattentive to any feedback that is offered.

Identity control theory is proposed largely within the context of interpersonal relationships (Kerpelman & Lamke, 1997; Kerpelman & Smith, 1999), although the identities to which feedback refers can pertain to any content domain (i.e., ego–personal domains, personal–social domains, social–structural domains, or all of these). Specifically, identity-relevant feedback is obtained from parents, close friends, romantic partners, or other significant individuals capable of providing
such feedback. In cases in which the feedback is incongruent with the identity in question (e.g., occupational choice), the importance of the identity is a significant determinant of whether the feedback will be accepted or rejected (Kerpelman & Lamke, 1997). That is, discrepant feedback will be accepted much more easily if one is not heavily invested in the identity being challenged. Individuals will more strongly resist discrepant feedback concerning identity elements to which they are highly committed.

Identity control theory stresses the importance of the adolescent–parent relationship in guiding identity development. Kerpelman and Smith (1999), for instance, found that the majority of adjudicated adolescent daughters in their sample had relationships with their mothers in which (a) the mother consistently invalidated the daughter’s positive identity statements (e.g., “I am smart” or “I want to be a doctor”); (b) the mother agreed with nearly all of the daughter’s assertions and provided no incongruent feedback; or (c) the mother contradicted whatever the daughter asserted about her identity, regardless of whether the assertion was positive or negative in nature. None of these situations are conducive to healthy identity development. Some suggest that a balance of congruent and incongruent feedback is necessary for healthy identity development (Kerpelman & Lamke, 1997; Kerpelman & Smith, 1999).

Despite the potential utility of identity control theory, Adams (1997) pointed out two principal shortcomings inherent in its approach. First, he criticized identity control theory for failing to specify the origins of one’s initial identity. Kerpelman et al. (1997a) replied that this initial identity is obtained through “parental introjects and identificatory mechanisms” (LaVoie, 1994, p. 17) or the attachment-theory concept that the initial self is formed by way of parental mirroring (e.g., Bowlby, 1980), or both of these. They proceeded to assert that this psychodynamically derived identity (i.e., identification; Freud, 1923/1961) is gradually replaced by way of interactions with, and feedback from, significant others during adolescence and young adulthood.

Adams’s (1997) second criticism involved the reciprocally causative nature of control theory. This reciprocal causation may suggest a mechanistic–contextualistic view of human development, a worldview that is theoretically and philosophically inconsistent with the choice-based orientation of the Eriksonian tradition. Kerpelman et al. (1997b) disputed this assertion by placing control theory completely within the contextualistic worldview (Reese & Overton, 1970)

It is worthy of note, however, that the behavioral tradition, which strongly deemphasizes choice and the ability of individuals to guide their own life paths, is often placed into the contextualistic worldview (e.g., Schlinger, 1996). Reciprocal determinism, a fundamental element of the contextualistic worldview, does not appear to allow for self-direction. In accordance with Adams’s argument, it is difficult to imagine choice, which has sometimes been used synonymously with exploration (Côté, 1996b), as part of identity control theory. In the context of the assumption that the individual is assumed to react to external feedback by modifying
(or maintaining) his or her identity, even if his or her reaction is mediated by identity style orientation, the role of choice in this process is not apparent. Although Kerpelman et al. (1997a) disputed Adams’s (1997) claim that their model was mechanistic, they did not refute his implicit claim that it was deterministic.

Identity control theory is the newest of the alternative identity models that have moved “the field beyond the identity status paradigm” (Adams, 1997, p. 359). It is the only extension or expansion model that does not draw significantly on Erikson, and, as a result, its core assumptions are the most at variance with those of the Eriksonian tradition on which identity is based. Because of this lack of congruity with Erikson’s approach, the validity of control theory as an approach to identity needs to be further established. In particular, the role of choice in identity control theory needs to be clarified.

In particular, issues of measurement and intervention may be most relevant and critical to the advancement of identity control theory. Because the theory focuses on microprocesses underlying exploration and identity formation, techniques used to measure these processes will need to be more precise than identity measures derived from more macro views of identity. Additionally, because of its focus on interpersonal relationships and on microprocesses, identity control theory may find its greatest use in intervention settings, in which the everyday business of forming a sense of self can be monitored and facilitated.

As a direct extension of identity status theory, Grotevant’s (1987) model focused primarily on personal identity. However, the addition of the microprocess oriented approach of Kerpelman and her colleagues may facilitate closer examination of the exploration process and of “the silent doings of ego synthesis” (Erikson, 1980, p. 110). Because identity control theory explores each successive interaction between the adolescent and his or her social environment (as well as the intrapsychic consequences of each such interaction), it may allow for the observation of the small steps that comprise the development and consolidation of a person’s identity. As a consequence of its microprocess approach, identity control theory may be one of the only identity neo-Eriksonian identity perspectives that draws significantly on ego identity. Watching an adolescent girl gradually separate herself from her mother and take steps toward self-definition, for example, would appear to represent the silent doings of ego synthesis.

Waterman: The Personal Expressiveness Construct. Waterman (1990) surveyed a sampling of identity interviews and found that, even among participants classified into the same identity status, there was a great deal of variability in terms of the quality of the exploration in which individuals had engaged and the commitments that they had enacted. Achieved individuals, in particular, tended to group themselves into two general categories. The first category included those who derived a high degree of personal meaning from the identity alternatives they had explored and to which they had committed. The second category, on the other hand, included those whose goals, values, and beliefs seemed to have been more extrinsically motivated, even though they had sorted through a number of prospec-
tive options and had selected one or more to which to commit (Waterman, 1992a, 1993b).

Waterman observed that this dimension of personal meaningfulness did not apply to participants in the foreclosed and moratorium statuses to the extent it did to those in the achieved status. He speculated that this was due to the limited number of options surveyed in the foreclosed status and to the incompleteness of personal identity inherent in the moratorium status. Furthermore, because diffused individuals had not explored or committed to any appreciable extent, the personal meaningfulness dimension did not seem to apply to them at all.

Waterman (1990) termed this personal meaningfulness dimension *personal expressiveness* because of its apparent similarity to Aristotle’s (trans. 1985) construct of the same name. Based on his observations of identity interviews and on Aristotle’s eudaimonist philosophy (and its extension by Norton, 1976), Waterman (1990, 1992a) defined personal expressiveness as feelings of optimal experience that accompany the discovery of one’s *daimon*, or set of best potentials, and the engagement in activities that are reflective of the daimon. Following the Aristotelian tradition, personal expressiveness is drawn from "a theory of ethics, calling upon people to recognize and live in accordance with their daimon" (Waterman, 1992a, p. 58). Although it is considered a form of happiness, personal expressiveness extends beyond hedonic (pure) enjoyment in that it involves a sense of purpose, direction, and fulfillment (Waterman, 1993b, 1993c, 1995). Personal expressiveness involves not only happiness and enjoyment but also an intense sense of personal meaning and direction within one’s life.

The concept of personal expressiveness is somewhat similar to Maslow’s (1968) concept of self-actualization. Unlike self-actualization, however, personal expressiveness is not specifically a personal trait. It is a state that accompanies activities that are reflective of the daimon but to the extent that it characterizes certain individuals when they are engaging in such activities, it may also be thought of as a personal characteristic. That is, an individual may be thought of as being personally expressive if he or she has identified one or more activities that promote feelings of personal expressiveness when he or she engages in them. It can, therefore, be argued that personal expressiveness is a characteristic shared by the combination of the individual and the activity. The intersection of the individual’s characteristics (e.g., internal locus of control, intrinsically motivated orientation, and identity exploration or commitment, or both; Waterman, 1992a) with the characteristics of the activities in which the individual engages (i.e., matching the individual’s innate potentials) produces feelings of personal expressiveness.

As such, personal expressiveness may be a step on the path to self-actualization. Identifying one’s best potentials, as well as engaging regularly in activities that draw on those potentials, is a necessary ingredient in becoming self-actualized (Maslow, 1968). Stephen King, the horror novelist, wrote in *The Stephen King Companion* (Beahm, 1989) that he would often write for hours at a time without
leaving his chair and that in many instances he would not even be aware that several hours had passed. Michael Jordan (1998) documented in his autobiography that, as a teenager, he often shot free throws from sunrise until sunset, barely noticing the day as it went by. These examples illustrate the intense involvement and the resulting tendency to lose track of time that accompany personally expressive activities.

Because the foreclosed, moratorium, and achieved statuses have been found in both personally expressive and instrumental (i.e., not personally expressive) variants (Waterman, 2000; Waterman, Lopez, Gruenfeld, & Jessee, 2000), personal expressiveness can be considered as a third dimension of identity development, along with exploration and commitment (Waterman, 1992a). As outlined previously, despite the fact that more personally expressive individuals are classified into the achieved status than into any of the other three statuses, the presence of exploration and commitment alone does not guarantee that the personal identity formed will be personally expressive (although the absence of exploration and commitment, i.e., the diffused status, virtually guarantees that whatever identity the individual holds will not be personally expressive).

One of the principal contributions of eudaimonist philosophy to neo-Eriksonian theory involves the inward search for innate potentials that may accompany the sorting through and commitment to externally presented alternatives. One must have a reasonable idea of what one’s best potentials might be before one can identify identity alternatives that may be personally expressive (Waterman, 1992b). In more concrete terms, a person cannot know what activities and identity choices match his or her unique best potentials until he or she has explored and discovered what those potentials are.

There are a number of reasons why individuals explore and commit to instrumental identity alternatives. Waterman (1992b) outlined four principal such reasons. First, one’s environment may constrict the array of prospective choices that one is able to investigate (Côté, 1996b; Phinney & Rosenthal, 1992). Second, competing social factors may lead individuals to make more socially acceptable choices rather than seeking their inner potentials (cf. Grotevant, 1987). Third, one may be distracted by “pleasures incompatible with the pursuit of their unique excellences or purposes” (Waterman, 1992b, p. 173; see also Waterman, 1993c). Fourth, one may decline the opportunity to pursue one’s optimal self because of potential difficulties involved in identifying or actualizing one’s inner potentials (Waterman, 1992a).

Like Grotevant’s (1987) process model, personal expressiveness constitutes an additional component of the identity status paradigm (Waterman, 1992a). The distinction between those goals, values, and beliefs that resonate with one’s true self and those that are chosen for other reasons provides insight into the identity search. The dimension of personal expressiveness versus instrumentalism may help to clarify individuals’ motivations to explore and commit to a given set of ideals. For example, it might be argued that a career decision made for any reason other than
an internal meshing of the occupation with one’s innate potentials (e.g., a high salary) is based primarily on extrinsically motivated factors (Waterman, 1995).

Personal expressiveness, then, might be assumed to fall completely under the heading of personal identity. The identity elements to which personal expressiveness have been applied generally pertain to personal domains, such as career choices and leisure activities (Schwartz & Waterman, 1998). These areas have been identified as ideological (Grodevant et al., 1982) or personal (Kurtines, 1999), fitting Erikson’s description of personal identity.

On the other hand, it could be argued that the daimon, on which personally expressive activities are based, is a component of ego identity. From a eudaimonist perspective, the daimon represents the core of one’s self. It remains unconscious and untapped until it is discovered during the course of engaging in activities that resonate with it (Aristotle, trans. 1985; Norton, 1976; Waterman, 1990). Once it is discovered, the daimon is assumed to become the center and focus of one’s life, and engagement in personally expressive activities has the effect of bringing the individual closer to his or her daimon so that it is better known and more frequently experienced (Waterman, 1995). Living in accordance with the daimon may represent continuity of personal character, given that an individual’s decisions and behaviors are likely to become more and more consistent as he or she becomes increasingly acquainted with his daimon (Waterman, 1992b, 1993b).

From an Eriksonian perspective, ego identity represents the core of one’s self. It is the most unconscious and least frequently experienced aspect of identity, in that its workings often take place without the individual’s awareness (Erikson, 1950). In terms of its status as the most fundamental aspect of self and its general absence from conscious awareness, ego identity appears to correspond closely to the daimon. Moreover, Erikson (1974) maintained that ego identity “is safest … when it is grounded in activities” (p. 105). This same description applies to the experience of the daimon (Waterman, 1990).

Expansions of Identity Status Theory

**Kurtines: The Co-constructivist Perspective.** Kurtines (1999; Kurtines, Azmitia, & Alvarez 1992; Kurtines, Berman, Itel, & Williamson, 1995) picked up, more or less, where French existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre left off. Kurtines brought a philosophical notion of the individual into the realm of psychological study. He conceptualized identity from a moral–developmental, existentialist perspective, emphasizing choice, self-control, responsibility, and integrity of character. He termed his model co-constructivist because development is conceptualized as a shared process between individuals and their social and cultural environments (cf. Adams & Marshall, 1996; Côté, 1993, 1996b). Society provides individuals with opportunities to develop cognitive and psychosocial competencies (i.e., social skills, educational credentials, etc.). In turn, individuals are responsible for promoting the growth and evolution of society.
From Kurtines’s co-constructivist viewpoint, the individual is viewed as an active, self-directed agent who chooses from available identity alternatives and is responsible for those choices and their consequences (cf. Waterman, 1992b). Individuals thereby become the producers of their own development (Lerner & Busch-Rossnagel, 1981). Making life choices, in a way that effectively facilitates exploration, requires the use of problem solving skills derived from the critical thinking literature (e.g., Elias et al., 1986; Spivack & Shure, 1982). Those skills are creativity, suspension of judgment, and critical evaluation. In sequence, these skills comprise the process by which informed, dispassionate, and unbiased decisions can be made. Their use in the context of making life choices has been shown to increase satisfaction and reduce distress concerning one’s sense of self (Arrufat, 1997; Ferrer-Wreder et al., in press).

Creativity denotes the ability to generate as many alternative solutions as possible when faced with a life choice. The individual lists every feasible alternative of which he or she is aware, regardless of whether the individual initially approves of it. Identifying alternatives with which one initially disagrees is an important component of the critical thinking process. One’s initial preferences and ways of thinking are examined, called into question, and contrasted with other available alternatives. If one generates only alternatives with which one agrees, then the process as a whole is compromised.

Suspension of judgment denotes the ability to avoid being biased toward or against any alternative the individual has generated. This involves listing arguments in favor of and against each alternative that he or she has generated, based more on logic than on personal investment. Kurtines (1999; Berman et al., in press; Kurtines, Azmitia, & Alvarez, 1992, Kurtines, Berman, Ittel, & Williamson, 1995) recommended listing negative qualities for one’s initial best choice and positive qualities for one’s initial worst choice, in the context of making an important life choice to see the other side of the coin. Suspending judgment involves disregarding any investment one has in any particular alternatives and eliminating potential choices only when the arguments in their favor are deemed inadequate. In this way, the alternative supported by the best argument will be selected, regardless of one’s initial preferences for or against that alternative. Critical evaluation denotes appraising the arguments for and against each alternative and choosing the one that is supported by the most favorable argument.

To understand the critical thinking process, one might picture a university-bound adolescent attempting to select a college at which to further her education. First, she must generate as many potential alternatives as possible (i.e., locate as many suitable universities as she can). Secondly, she must critically evaluate each university. That is, she must list positive and negative aspects of each one. Finally, she must make an informed choice. Provided that she has subjected each and every potential alternative to critical evaluation, her ultimate choice is likely to be different than her original best choice.
An additional skill, **critical discussion**, represents the use of the first three critical skills in an interpersonal context. The advantage of critical discussion over conducting the process intrapsychically is that fallacious reasoning can be pointed out and corrected by one’s peers (Kurtines et al., 1992). In fact, critical discussion is a method by which critical problem solving skills can be fostered in individuals (Berman & Schwartz, 1999; Ferrer-Wreder et al., in press; Kurtines, 1999; Schwartz, 2000). Practicing critical problem solving and identifying faulty logic while examining someone else’s life choice may help one to begin utilizing these skills in resolving one’s own life dilemmas.

Kurtines spoke of **critical identity** (i.e., personal and social) as a sense of self that is co-constructed and revised by way of critical problem solving and discussion. He maintained that all healthy individuals are capable of establishing a critical identity by late adolescence but that the establishment of such an identity is dependent on individuals possessing the necessary critical skills. The responsibility for fostering these skills in individuals lies with social institutions (e.g., schools, family, religion, etc.). In turn, individuals who demonstrate critical identity may tend to be more socially responsible and less likely to be disruptive within society (Elias et al. 1986).

Like Erikson, Kurtines viewed identity development as occurring at the interface of self and society, with individual development and social–institutional processes mutually influencing one another (Briones, 1997). Although social institutions, such as family, schools, and government, carry the responsibility for fostering critical problem-solving skills in individuals, individuals in turn are expected to demonstrate integrity of character. **Integrity of character** is the state of assuming control over one’s choices and their consequences, along with taking responsibility for those choices and consequences (Waterman, 1992b). Opportunities to develop a workable sense of identity are maximized, and a favorable environment for individual development and societal evolution is created, when this reciprocal relation (i.e., social institutions promoting critical skills and individuals demonstrating integrity of character) is in place. If either party in this reciprocal relation does not fulfill its part, individuals are likely to become marginalized from the social institutions that would ordinarily foster critical skills (Côté & Allahar, 1996). In turn, when people feel that society has let them down, they are less likely to demonstrate the integrity of character that contributes to healthy social systems. The result is often manifested in the form of the diffused status (Kurtines, 1999).

Kurtines (1999) maintained that the reciprocal relation between psychic structures and social institutions holds that social institutions are most likely to attend to those individuals whose personality attributes reflect the characteristics and beliefs of the social institutions (cf. Adams & Marshall, 1996; Côté, 1993). Individuals who do not possess the personality characteristics and attributes valued by mainstream social institutions are at risk of becoming alienated from those in-
stitutions (Côté, 1996a). Given the reciprocal relation between personality structure and social institutions, individuals who do not participate in social institutions do not have the opportunity to contribute to the further development of those institutions (cf. Côté, 1993). Because the characteristics of social institutions are generally reflective of the personality attributes of mainstream individuals, those who do not contribute to the development of social institutions are likely to remain ostracized from them (Adams & Marshall, 1996).

The marginalization of inner-city, low income, minority youth, and the reciprocal relation between their disinterest in the conventional social system (e.g., schools, government, and family) and society’s seeming apathy toward these individuals (e.g., Adams & Marshall, 1996; Côté, 1993) has been of particular interest to Kurtines and his colleagues (Berman, Kurtines, Silverman, & Serafini, 1996; Berman, Silverman, & Kurtines, 2000; Ferrer-Wreder et al., in press). One striking feature of such marginalized individuals is their failure to utilize the critical problem-solving and decision-making skills that Kurtines described and to assume responsibility for their choices (Ferrer-Wreder et al., in press; Kurtines, Silverman, Schwartz, & Montgomery, 2000).

Because of its emphasis on skills development and social responsibility, two concepts that can readily be promoted in group contexts (Gara et al., 1986; Tetlock, 1992), Kurtines’s theory is useful for developing intervention strategies. By conducting critical discussion groups, Kurtines and colleagues (Berman & Schwartz, 1999; Ferrer-Wreder et al., in press; Schwartz & Kurtines, 2000) fostered the development of critical skills and integrity of character in both mainstream university students and low-income, minority, high school students. Many of the individuals who participated in these intervention programs improved the quality of their lives significantly afterward (Kurtines et al., 2000).

Relations between Kurtines’s model and the identity statuses have only begun to be investigated. Berman et al. (in press) found that the committed statuses, foreclosure and achievement, were low in critical problem-solving skills, whereas moratorium and diffused individuals were equally proficient at utilizing these skills. This may be a function of the fact that both of these statuses reflect some degree of exploration, although the exploration inherent in the diffused status is often haphazard and disorganized.

The identity statuses have also been associated with Kurtines’s model by way of intervention. Berman (1998) and Ferrer-Wreder et al. (in press) demonstrated that fostering critical skills and integrity of character through critical discussion groups may lead to a softening of existing identity commitments (cf. Kurtines et al., 1992). In combination with the finding that critical skills are highest in the moratorium and diffused statuses, this may support Kroger’s (1996) assertion that distancing oneself from existing commitments is the first step toward exploring a new set of identity alternatives.

Based on the previous discussion, it can be said that Kurtines’s greatest contribution to the identity literature was the introduction of a set of competencies that
can be used to promote identity development. His focus on marginalized inner-city youth brings the identity construct further into the applied arena to address one of the prevailing social problems of the late 20th and early 21st centuries: the disengagement of young people from normative social institutions (cf. Côté & Allahar, 1996). Kurtines’s emphasis on social responsibility and integrity of character, drawing on social as well as personal identity, has helped neo-Eriksonian identity theory to be more multidimensional than the identity status model has been.

**Adams: Developmental Social Psychology of Identity.** Another expansion model with a multidimensional focus was Adams’s developmental contextual approach (Adams & Marshall, 1996; Adams et al., 1987). Whereas Kurtines spoke of context as one broadly based phenomenon, Adams divided the social context, in which identity is assumed to be embedded, into two levels: the micro and macro contexts. The *micro context* refers to interpersonal exchanges and relations in which personal identity is directly affected by means of dialogue and other forms of direct contact (i.e., the microsystem; Bronfenbrenner, 1979). The *macro context* refers to more overarching social and cultural contexts in which social identity is shaped by the invoking of cultural norms, practices, and beliefs (i.e., the exosystem; Bronfenbrenner, 1979). The effects of the macro context are implemented through micro contexts, as in cultural norms being taught to children by their parents.

Côté (1993) proposed that a developmental–social view of identity should examine the reciprocal relation between individual psychic structure and social–institutional (i.e., macro) processes. To this formulation, Adams and Marshall (1996) added an intermediate layer, the *micro level* (i.e., the mesosystem; Bronfenbrenner, 1979), which is responsible for the transmission of social–institutional norms to individual persons and of individual thoughts and ideas to social institutions. Social–institutional rules and standards are taught interpersonally by parents and teachers, for example, and individuals are provided with opportunities to open businesses, write books, and express their thoughts interpersonally in ways that have the potential to affect social–institutional practices.

Adams viewed the development of self and identity at the intersection of two opposing yet complementary processes, differentiation and integration (cf. Blos, 1962). *Differentiation* is the individual dynamic, the process of asserting oneself as a unique individual and of highlighting one’s unique characteristics. *Integration*, on the other hand, is the social dynamic, the process of becoming part of a larger group, becoming connected to others, fitting in with familial, social, cultural norms, or all of these. Differentiation might be taken to represent individuation and the development of personal identity, whereas integration appears to represent conventionality and the development of social identity (cf. Erikson, 1980). Although differentiation and integration may appear incompatible, it is the interplay and balance between the two processes that produces healthy identity development (Adams & Marshall, 1996; Grotevant & Cooper, 1986; Josselson, 1988; Kegan,
1982; Kidwell, Fischer, Dunham, & Baranowski, 1983; Kroger, 1989). Erikson (1950) defined autonomy as the state of having individuated from significant others yet still being connected to them (cf. Josselson, 1988)—a definition that appears to describe the interplay of differentiation and integration.

High levels of differentiation can lead to rejection by others and to being branded as a maverick or an eccentric because of one’s socially aberrant lifestyle. Similarly, low levels of integration can result in marginalization from society and from its institutions, as in the case of low-income, minority youth (cf. Côté & Allahar, 1996; Kurtines et al., 2000). Individuals who deviate too strongly from socially accepted practices and beliefs or who do not subscribe sufficiently to socially sanctioned ways of being are likely to become outcasts. Furthermore, entire groups of people can be marginalized if their collective belief systems are sufficiently divergent from those of the mainstream culture (Côté, 1993). This is likely to happen in the case of minority individuals who identify strongly with their ethnic subculture (Phinney & Rosenthal, 1992).

At the other extreme, individuals who are overly integrated and poorly differentiated are at risk of becoming overly dependent on cultural norms and rules for guidance on how to conduct themselves (e.g., Josselson, 1987). These individuals are apt to form normative based identities (cf. Berzonsky, 1990; Berzonsky & Neimeyer, 1988) and to be classified into the foreclosed status (Adams & Marshall, 1996). In extreme cases, they may display what Archer and Waterman (1990) termed appropriated foreclosure, or complete and wholesale adoption of group standards without question.

Accordingly, following Erikson, Adams delineated two distinct forms of identity: personal identity and collective identity (i.e., social identity). Personal identity represents those aspects of self that have been differentiated and self-created and that sets one apart from others. Conversely, collective identity represents aspects of self that have been integrated from the social system—those that identify an individual with the group (or cultural context) to which he or she belongs. Idiosyncratic word choices, for instance, are part of one’s personal identity because they help to differentiate oneself from other individuals. On the other hand, one’s native language is an element of collective identity because it identifies individuals with their country of origin.

Adams’s developmental contextualism borrowed a number of concepts from systems theory (e.g., Ford & Lerner, 1992). Among these, Adams and Marshall (1996) highlighted permeability as a significant property of identity systems. Permeability denotes the extent to which a given identity is open to change by way of social influences. For example, an adolescent who identifies heavily with his father is likely to adjust his self-image in response to the father’s input, whereas an adolescent whose identity is largely self-created may be more resistant to parental suggestions (Grotevant & Cooper, 1986).

Differentiation is likely to inhibit permeability because a sense of personal or social identity that is held as unique and as belonging exclusively to an individual...
may not be open to input from others. On the other hand, integration is apt to promote permeability because a personal or social identity that is based on social norms can be easily influenced by the social forces through which the identity was created. Individuals who are viewed as mavericks or who are marginalized from social systems are unlikely to be responsive to those systems (Côté, 1993).

Following Grotevant (1992) and others, Adams and Marshall (1996) distinguished between identity elements that are assigned and those that are chosen. Assigned identity elements are integrated by way of imitation and identification (cf. Erikson, 1968; Freud, 1930/1965). Such elements are borrowed directly from the social or cultural environment and integrated into one’s identity with little or no modification. Chosen identity elements are added to identity through self-construction, specifically by way of information seeking and other exploratory processes (cf. Berzonsky, 1989, 1990; Kurtines, 1999). The ratio of assigned to chosen elements is likely to be a function not only of individual differences (e.g., Berzonsky, 1989) but also of the micro and macro contexts (Adams & Marshall, 1996; Côté, 1993, 1996b).

For Adams, change in identity is initiated in one of two ways. The simplest method of modifying identity is for new elements to be integrated directly from the social environment. A more complex method of identity change (i.e., differentiation) stems from the recognition of incompatibilities between the real self and the ideal self and the distress that is likely to ensue (cf. Dunham et al., 1986; Erikson, 1950; Kroger & Green, 1996; Levinson, 1977; Stephen et al., 1992). Self-construction processes (i.e., the informational style and critical decision making) are then used to narrow the gap between the real and ideal selves and to reduce identity-related distress. Most cultural contexts have sensitive points at which incongruities between the real and ideal selves are most likely to be addressed (Dunham et al., 1986; Erikson, 1950; Levinson, 1977).

Chosen identity elements can be selected for a number of reasons. These include the desire to individuate, self-determination, the desire to belong, social responsibility, justice, or care for others. It can be assumed that these motivations can act in combination with one another as well as alone. A young man might become a teacher, for instance, out of a sense of social responsibility as well as a sense of caring for young people. Similarly, a woman might enlist in the armed forces both to individuate from gender stereotypes and to serve justice for her country.

The developmental contextual perspective offered by Adams might be seen as a midpoint between Kurtines’s co-constructivist approach, which incorporates contextual elements but is still individualistic, and Côté’s (1997) identity capital model, which focuses primarily on the social and cultural context in identity development. Adams’s person-in-context viewpoint incorporated both the personal and social levels of identity and their embeddedness in the social and cultural environment. Adams’s model, therefore, is more expansive than identity status and begins to approach the multidimensionality and scope that Erikson offered.
Côté: The Identity Capital Model. Côté (1997) constructed a sociological view of identity, called the identity capital model, primarily within the social–structural level of analysis. The identity capital model examines social and, to a somewhat lesser extent, personal identity from a macro perspective. Although Côté addressed the mechanism by which identity is formed (i.e., negotiation with peers, social institutions, family members, etc. for memberships and other social resources; cf. Kerpelman et al., 1997a, 1997b), his theory focused primarily on the results of the identity formation process; that is, the social viability of the identity that one possesses. Identity components such as specific skills, beliefs, or attitudes are seen as resources that individuals can utilize in the process of negotiating for social memberships, status, and other societal assets. Individuals who have something significant with which to negotiate are more likely to be successful in obtaining social resources than those who do not. For instance, many college fraternities and sororities in the United States solicit individuals with certain income levels, high self-esteem, and well developed social skills.

According to the identity capital model, identity capital resources vary in degree of tangibility–intangibility. Tangible resources include financial assets, club memberships, and the like, whereas intangible resources denote personality attributes that increase one’s ability to exchange social assets with others and with social institutions such as schools, clubs, or corporations. Tangible attributes can include financial resources (including parents’ financial capital), educational credentials (academic capital), socially rewarded competencies such as physical strength (human capital; cf. Becker, 1993), fraternity–sorority and club or association memberships (social capital; cf. Coleman, 1988), speech patterns (linguistic capital; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977), and parental social status (cultural capital; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1977). Intangible attributes include intrapsychic characteristics such as self-esteem, purpose in life, ego strength, and an internal locus of control as well as any unique skills or talents that one possesses (Côté, 1996b, 1997).

In overall terms, one’s identity capital refers to one’s net assets in terms of who one is and what one has accomplished. In the sociological context, these assets and accomplishments help one to establish a viable sense of adulthood and to surround oneself with a validating community. Generally speaking, the identity capital model assumes that, when compared to individuals who have not established themselves securely in adulthood and in stable communities, individuals who have done so will score higher on measures of tangible and intangible resources.

Many of the various forms of capital (e.g., human capital, social capital, and cultural capital) can be conceptualized as elements of identity capital (Côté, 1996a, 1996b, 1997). Social capital and human capital are indicators of having found a validating and stable community. Individuals who have found such a community will possess greater levels of social and human capital than will those who have not. Côté (1996a) defined cultural capital as one’s parents’ social status, but for individuals who have established themselves as adults, cultural capital would more accurately refer to their own social status. Linguistic capital is, to some de-
gree, a function of academic capital because more advanced speech patterns are normally found in educated individuals. Financial capital is highly valued by many social institutions, but because it is not necessarily a function of either adult status or the presence of a validating and supportive community, it is not a component of identity capital (Côté, 1996b), and it does not contribute significantly to predicting identity capital acquisition (Côté, 1997).

In essence, identity capital can be viewed as a significant determinant of whether one is able to negotiate successfully in late-modern society. Lower-income, inner-city youth with few career choices, low self-worth, and a multitude of financial barriers, for instance, would likely be low in both tangible and intangible forms of capital (Côté & Allahar, 1996). Conversely, mainstream individuals who are able to attend university, start professional careers, and have higher levels of self-esteem would be expected to have more tangible and intangible capital.

Because of the decreased impact of mainstream social institutions on entire segments of the population in late-modern societies such as the United States, Canada, and northern Europe, the presenting identity problem is often one of diffusion. As Kurtines (1999) observed, late-modern social systems often provide little or no guidance and structure to certain classes of people in making workable choices and participating effectively in society, thus leaving whole segments of the population marginalized from important social resources such as family and education. With traditional moralistic norms largely removed from the societal context and an ‘every man for himself’ mentality instituted in their place, developing a workable sense of identity becomes a difficult and often impossible task (Côté, 1996b; Côté & Allahar, 1996; Ferrer-Wreder et al., in press; Kegan, 1994; Kurtines et al., 1995; Kurtines et al., 2000). Interventions to promote identity development may be necessary as late-modern societal structure becomes more and more nebulous (Archer, 1994; Josselson, 1994; Kurtines et al., 2000). Individuals without experience in making effective life choices and in demonstrating integrity of character may need to be counseled and guided to acquire decision making skills and a sense of responsibility for their choices.

The concept of identity capital becomes crucial in a late-modern environment. With little help from social institutions, individuals are left largely on their own to manage their lives. Whereas tangible resources such as skills, money, and social status are important forms of identity capital in developing societies, intangible resources are most important in late-modern life. Self-esteem, a sense of purpose, an internal locus of control (i.e., the feeling that one is in control of one’s own life), and continuity and integrity of character have been found to be among the most effective predictors of identity capital acquisition (Côté, 1997). A critical, informational, personally expressive identity, or all of these, may also contribute to identity capital and its acquisition.

Côté’s (1997) theory complemented those offered by Kurtines and Adams by exploring the micro and macro contexts in which personal and social identity are embedded (Adams & Marshall, 1996; Ferrer-Wreder et al., in press; Kurtines,
1999). Erikson wrote extensively on social context—something that the identity status model has only begun to acknowledge (e.g., recent work on gender and ethnic identity). Erikson’s theory focused on all three levels of the hierarchical domain organization method: ego–personal, personal–social, and social–structural. Côté (1996b) did not concentrate on the ego-personal level of analysis, leaving that territory for more psychologically oriented theorists. Côté’s model focused principally on the social–structural level of analysis but also incorporated the personal–social level. Côté stated (e.g., 1996a, 1996b) in a number of writings that his approach combines traditionally psychological approaches to identity with those originating in the sociological realm. This was also the focus of Erikson’s work, and in fact Côté (1996a) noted that several psychological and sociological disciplines pay homage to Erikson for their theoretical orientations and principles.

Conceptualizing the Alternative Models Within a Broader Framework

Although identity status and the six alternative models of identity presented in this article appear somewhat divergent, it may be possible to organize them into a comprehensive framework. In this section of the article, one possible template for building such a framework is proposed. First, taxonomic methods for organizing the alternative models, along with identity status theory, are introduced. Second, an argument is put forth that specific elements of the identity status model, along with variables and correlates from Berzonsky, Grotevant, Waterman, Adams, and Kurtines, can be placed under the umbrella of intangible identity capital resources in Côté’s model. Both of these endeavors are advanced for the purposes of (a) strengthening the overall validity of contemporary identity theory and research and (b) organizing the seemingly divergent views of identity so that they can be compared, studied together, and potentially integrated into a single overarching perspective on identity.

A Taxonomy for Organizing Psychosocial Identity Theories

Creating a taxonomy for organizing the identity models covered in this article can be accomplished in either, or both, of two ways. First, one can organize theories based on the process by which they postulate identity to be formed, utilizing the discovery–creation distinction put forth by Waterman (1984). Second, one can organize theories based on the structural aspects of identity that they emphasize, utilizing Erikson’s ego, personal, and social levels of identity. Both methods facilitate the organization of models into logical groupings, which in turn can facilitate integrative theoretical statements and comparative empirical studies. Additionally, it may be possible to utilize both taxonomic methods simultaneously.

Organizing Models by Process. Waterman (1984) offered two metaphorical processes by which identity could be formed—self-discovery and self-construc-
tion—with self-discovery grounded in the eudaimonist philosophy in which essence precedes existence and self-construction grounded in the existentialist philosophy in which existence precedes essence (Waterman, 1993b). “The identity status paradigm is neutral with respect to the constructivist–discovery issue” (Waterman, 1984, p. 329), thus leaving open the possibility that identity theories could be designed from either perspective.

If one were to organize the alternative identity models reviewed in this article into self-construction models and self-discovery models, the views of Berzonsky, Grotevant, Kurtines, and Adams would be classified under self-construction, whereas Waterman would be placed into the self-discovery category. Côté, like the identity status model, would not be placed into either category because identity capital does not specify whether identity is constructed or discovered.

The importance of such an organization among theories would likely lie in its facilitation of integrative studies and theoretical statements between or among theories (e.g., Schwartz, Mullis, Waterman, & Dunham, 2000). A taxonomy of identity theories, thus, opens up the possibility of creating a more integrative statement about what identity is and how it comes into existence. For instance, Berman et al. (in press) placed Berzonsky’s and Kurtines’s constructivist models under the scope of Grotevant’s broader constructivist conceptualization. More specifically, where Grotevant posited exploration as a function of the abilities and orientations that one brings to the process, Berman et al. found that Kurtines’s theory could provide the abilities, and Berzonsky’s model could provide the orientations, that facilitate identity development. If exploration is indeed the intersection of problem-solving preferences and competencies, then one could assume that individuals oriented toward engaging in exploratory activities would still need to possess the necessary competencies, and vice versa. This introduces the possibility of building a single overarching constructivist conceptualization of ego identity, which would represent one potential pathway of identity change within Adams’s developmental contextualist theory (i.e., self-construction; Adams & Marshall, 1996) and would capture the mechanisms by which Côté (1996a) believed personal and social identity to be formed (i.e., skills and orientations).

Organizing Models by Structure. A second method of organizing neo-Eriksonian theories of identity involves specifying which of Erikson’s levels of identity are captured by each model. All of the models include a personal identity component, and personal identity has been, by far, the most widely studied of Erikson’s three levels (Côté & Levine, 1988). The prevalence of personal identity within the various neo-Eriksonian conceptualizations (including Marcia) seems to suggest that personal identity would be the best place to begin formulating an integrative perspective.

Turning to the other levels of identity, it appears that only the three expansion models include a social identity component. Kurtines, Adams, and Côté all considered the role of social and cultural contexts in identity development. This com-
mon element allows for these three models to be grouped together under the heading of personal–social identity.

The extension models, although they focus primarily on personal identity, can each be argued to highlight ego identity to some degree. Berzonsky discussed continuity of personal character; the identity control theory extension of Grotevant’s process model focused on the microprocesses that drive identity development; and the daimon, which constituted the core of Waterman’s model, can be logically compared to ego identity. If one accepts these premises and if one, thus, agrees that the extension models each include an ego identity component, one can group these conceptualizations under the heading of ego–personal identity.

Like the constructivist-discovery taxonomy, the ego–personal–social taxonomy allows for intertranslations and empirical comparisons between and among theories. For example, grouping Kurtines, Adams, and Côté together under a single heading facilitates the examination of clear associations among the three views of identity. Such a grouping might further permit the integration of these three models into a single personal–social view of identity (e.g., Côté, 1993). Kurtines specified the skills and orientations that facilitate successful negotiation with the social world, Côté specified the social and cultural processes that guide and direct identity development, and Adams described the interplay between the two.

Conceptualizing Identity Elements as Intangible Identity Capital Resources

Because identity capital is defined as tangible and intangible resources that individuals bring to their interpersonal and social negotiations, it may be theoretically defensible to conceptualize as intangible identity capital resources certain elements from identity status theory, Erikson’s model of identity, and the several alternative models. Given the objective of formulating an integrative and multidimensional perspective on identity, it may be especially advantageous to conceptualize elements of the various identity theories as intangible capital resources. Identity capital may serve as the best template because it is the broadest and most socially and externally oriented of the neo-Eriksonian models reviewed in this article. Côté (1993) claimed that a developmental–social psychological approach should “have the capacity to subsume other developmental frameworks, rather than competing with them” (p. 32). The term subsume indicates a theory with a larger scope encompassing the tenets of a theory in which the scope is more focused and less broad. The broader theory can serve not only to organize research findings within a field, but also to organize more focused theoretical perspectives and map the interrelations among them (Kurtines & Silverman, 1999). Because the more focused theories are likely to be more precise and to address smaller conceptual areas in greater depth, including them under the umbrella of a larger theory has the effect of merging the strengths of the broadly based theoretical framework with those of the more focused and precise models. The result is a more comprehensive approach
that stretches over multiple levels of analysis and addresses each with precision and
detail—a description that may apply to and potentially expand Erikson’s theory

Côté (1996b) suggested that skills, orientations, self-knowledge, and competencies that help in navigating oneself in the complex and ambiguous nature of late-modern society with less external help are taken to represent intangible forms of identity capital. For example, given that the acquisition of Kurtines’s critical skills in marginalized individuals has been shown to facilitate increases in those individuals’ social and academic achievements (e.g., finishing high school, entering into functional intimate relationships, and reconciling with estranged family members), these critical skills may be seen as intangible elements or antecedents of identity capital acquisition. Hence, identity capital should include the variety of skills, abilities, and self-knowledge put forth by alternative identity theorists (e.g., information seeking orientation, Berzonsky, 1989; orientation toward exploration, Grotevant, 1987; knowledge and living in accordance with one’s inner potentials, Waterman, 1990; critical problem-solving skills and integrity of character, Kurtines, 1999; and optimal levels of differentiation and integration; Adams & Marshall, 1996).

Because the Kurtines, Adams, and Côté models all focus on personal and social identity while emphasizing these two levels to differing extents, a combination of the three would more fully encompass both and would approximate the developmental–social framework that Erikson envisioned (Côté, 1993). For instance, Kurtines’s focus on integrity of character and critical problem solving, in combination with Adams’s interplay of differentiation and integration and Côté’s focus on the macro social context, paints a coherent picture of how an individual’s personal identity is embedded in his or her social and cultural milieu.

Elements of the extension models would then be incorporated as intangible identity capital resources. Each extension model focuses primarily on personal identity and secondarily on ego identity. For instance, identity style is primarily a personal characteristic, although its consistency and stability draw on continuity of personal character. The microprocesses highlighted by identity control theory may represent the workings of ego synthesis. Personal expressiveness involves tapping into basic, fundamental, and unconscious aspects of identity.

Elements of the Kurtines and Adams expansion models could also be incorporated as intangible personal resources. The interplay between differentiation and integration might also be considered an intangible identity capital resource (cf. Josselson, 1988). Differentiation is crucial to identity formation in a late-modern society because of the need for creativity and specific skills that underlie exploration. Integration, on the other hand, would seem to be an important identity capital resource because social institutions generally provide the greatest amount of support to individuals who have incorporated socially endorsed characteristics into their personal and social identities (Côté, 1993). Finally, critical problem-solving skills and integrity of character might be considered components of identity.
capital because these attributes help to reinvest young people in the social institutions (e.g., family and school) that have an impact on their lives (Kurtines et al., 2000).

It stands to reason, then, that an integrative expansion model incorporating elements of identity status and the extension and expansion models as intangible personal resources would extend neo-Eriksonian theory across all of the three levels addressed by Erikson. It has been postulated that Erikson’s most comprehensive vision was of a developmental–social approach tying together the most internal and unconscious aspects of identity (i.e., ego identity), goals and beliefs (i.e., personal identity), and embeddedness within social and cultural contexts (i.e., social identity). The integrative template proposed here may constitute a step in that direction. It would allow for greater cross-cultural validity and multidimensionality, and its emphasis on context would remove some of the pro-Western bias inherent in the identity status paradigm (cf. Côté & Levine, 1988).

Identity Interventions: Moving Identity Theory and Research Into the Applied Arena

One of the most recent developments in identity research has been the advent of identity interventions (Archer, 1989b, 1994; Marcia, 1989). Interventions represent efforts to promote identity development in adolescents and young adults. By definition, identity interventions are most relevant to late-modern society, in which individuals have little or no societal structure and guidance on which to rely in forming a sense of who they are (Côté, 1996a, 1996b; Côté & Allahar, 1996; Ferrer-Wreder et al., in press; Kurtines, 1999; Kurtines et al., 2000). Intervention is the first attempt by the identity research community to reach out to adolescents and young adults in need of such guidance and structure. Thus far, results have been moderate but promising.

Enright, Ganiere, Buss, Lapsley, and Olson (1983) conducted the first reported identity intervention, focusing on the development of perspective taking skills as a way of facilitating exploration. Markstrom-Adams, Ascione, Braegger, and Adams (1993) expanded on the Enright et al. work by incorporating more diversified problem-solving tasks into their intervention program. Both of these efforts were mildly successful in promoting exploration and identity development as a whole, although these researchers emphasized that there was clearly more work to be done in the area of intervention design and implementation.

More recently, Archer (1994) compiled a volume of recommendations for identity interventions. Among the recommendations put forth in that volume were that (a) interventions, like basic research studies, need to be grounded in theory and put forth to facilitate specific identity processes (Josselson, 1994) and (b) such interventions need to be tailored to the population being studied (Markstrom-Adams & Spencer, 1994). Some intervention studies have begun to follow the recommendations put forth by Archer (e.g., Berman & Schwartz, 1999; Ferrer-Wreder et al., in
press; Kurtines et al., 2000; Milnitsky-Sapiro et al., 2000; Schwartz, 2000), and these studies have shown that identity processes can indeed be manipulated and enhanced by way of intervention.

The most recent intervention studies operationalized identity processes from Kurtines (1999) co-constructivist viewpoint, although Schwartz (2000) highlighted the need to incorporate other perspectives. Kurtines’s theory is particularly amenable to intervention because of its emphasis on self-directed development in adolescence and adulthood, use of critical skills as a handle for facilitating exploration, and use of critical discussion in addressing real life problems. Berzonsky’s (1989) theory also appears to be amenable to intervention because of its emphasis on identity formation as a process. In fact, Ferrer-Wreder et al. (in press) obtained a significant decrease in use of the normative style in their co-constructivist intervention.

To provide a contrast with the critical skills development program, Schwartz (2000) incorporated a discovery-based component (derived from Waterman, 1990) into the co-constructivist intervention. Although the discovery-based intervention used the same group format as the critical discussion intervention, it facilitated feelings of personal expressiveness and hedonic enjoyment, thereby demonstrating that identity interventions can be conducted using multiple approaches to identity. Schwartz also reported increases in identity capital in both the self-construction and self-discovery intervention conditions.

The future of identity interventions appears to lie in facilitating exploration in diffused and foreclosed adolescents and young adults (Kurtines et al., 2000; Marcia, 1989). Marcia (1995) cautioned that diffusion requires qualitatively different intervention strategies than foreclosure does. Diffused individuals often suffer from atrophy of will and lack of sufficient motivation (Archer & Waterman, 1990; Berzonsky, 1985; Marcia, 1980), and they are more likely than individuals classified into the other statuses to have substance-abuse problems (Jones, 1992; White, Winn, & Young, 1998). What they may need most, then, is a push, or guided exploration of identity choices in which they might be interested (particularly in the case of high-risk individuals).

Foreclosed individuals have also been mentioned as a target for intervention efforts (e.g., Marcia, 1994, 1995). Foreclosure represents a set of rigidly formed and maintained commitments that are not questioned along with the unwillingness to consider other alternatives. However, despite the somewhat pejorative view of foreclosure that Marcia (1980) may have adopted (Côté & Levine, 1988), some writers have argued that foreclosure is adaptive and functional in many contexts (e.g., ethnic minorities and collectivistic cultures; Phinney & Rosenthal, 1992; Streitmatter, 1988). Thus, there is the question of whether foreclosed individuals would need intervention at all—especially those not at risk for problem behaviors.

If one is to intervene with foreclosed individuals, their existing beliefs must be loosened before exploration of new alternatives can take place (Kroger, 1996; Kroger & Green, 1996). Facilitating the softening or even abandonment of these
commitments is a risky endeavor because the sudden transition from a structured, tried-and-true lifestyle to a state of anomie can cause severe psychological distress (Marcia, 1994). Care must be taken to guide the foreclosed individual carefully through the process of letting go of existing goals, values, and beliefs and updating them with new information.

Overview and Conclusions

In this article, I reviewed some of the major issues in the identity formation field. First, I traced the legacy of identity from Freud’s writings on imitation and identification, through Erikson’s groundbreaking psychosocial model, and into Marcia’s identity status paradigm and the alternative identity models that have emerged since 1987. Measurement, an issue that has received comparatively little attention in the identity literature, was reviewed. Intervention, a promising new direction for identity research, was also examined.

The remainder of this article was devoted to addressing several divergent views of identity currently being explored and researched. Despite the wealth of research validating and extending each of these viewpoints, efforts to ascertain the relations and possible areas of convergence among them have been scarce. Taxonomic methods for organizing theories may assist in the formulation and design of such studies.

In summary, neo-Eriksonian identity theory has come a long way since Marcia’s (1966) introductory publication. Identity theory has been extended and expanded to include more concepts that were included in Erikson’s original writings on identity, such as consideration of individual differences; the search for, discovery, and utilization of innate potentials; critical problem solving skills; social responsibility; integrity of character; social and cultural contexts; and all three levels of identity introduced by Erikson.

Future Directions for Identity Research

The first 20 years of identity research were dedicated to establishing the construct validity of the identity status model (Waterman, 1988). Perhaps in response to uncertainties about whether that was adequately established (Berzonsky & Adams, 1999; Côté & Levine, 1988; Meeus et al., 1999; van Hoof, 1999; Waterman, 1988), some members of the identity community have begun to move the study of identity beyond the identity statuses (Adams, 1997). As discussed previously, a number of alternative identity models have been created as part of that effort. These models may constitute one way to extend and expand the neo-Eriksonian identity theory to be more faithful to and representative of Erikson.

The recent introduction of several diverse and innovative theoretical perspectives is a possible indication that the identity community is pursuing the develop-
mental–social approach that Erikson envisioned. In the service of that goal, there appear to be five potential and promising directions for the future of identity theory and research. Significant amounts of work have already been done in each of these areas, and in many cases the individuals who have been conducting such studies and developing theoretical explorations are continuing to pursue their lines of research. Following up on these five areas is likely to increase the theoretical and empirical interest devoted to the identity construct.

One promising future direction for identity research is continued emphasis on the extension and expansion models, including the creation of new models and studies ascertaining the network of relations among existing models. As Adams (1997) stated, the time has come to move the identity construct beyond the limits of the identity status paradigm. Erikson’s (1950, 1968, 1982) writings on identity included coverage of multiple facets of identity and the interrelations among those facets. The alternative identity models have helped to cover aspects of Erikson’s theory of identity that Marcia did not address and, thus, to increase the breadth and utility of neo-Eriksonian theory. Ascertaining the relations among the alternative models, as well as introducing additional models to cover those aspects of Erikson that remain to be explored, is an important element in the advancement of identity theory and research. One prime example of a linkage between alternative identity models that needs to be empirically established is that among Kurtines’s, Adams’s, and Côté’s developmental–social perspectives. The establishment of such a linkage may constitute a step toward creating a model of identity that examines all three levels of analysis and is as faithful to Erikson’s original writings on identity as possible (cf. Côté, 1993; Côté & Levine, 1987, 1988).

A second promising direction for future identity research is continuing and extending current work on the effects of social–cultural contexts, including family environment, gender, ethnicity, and subculture, on personal and social identity (Adams et al., 1987; Adams & Marshall, 1996; Archer, 1992; Phinney & Rosenthal, 1992). Increased emphasis on external context is important for two reasons. First, drawing on the initial future direction, context is a key component of each of the expansion models reviewed in this article. Second, understanding how identity is embedded in interpersonal, social, and cultural contexts is a necessary ingredient in the design of effective intervention programs (Markstrom-Adams & Spencer, 1994) and basic research studies (Côté, 1993, 1996a). Bronfenbrenner’s (1990) ecological model of human development provided several levels of social and cultural context in which identity may be embedded. Although identity research has begun to explore the ways in which identity is embedded in social and cultural contexts (e.g., Adams & Marshall, 1996; Côté, 1996b, 1997; Kurtines, 1999), much work remains to be done in this area.

A third promising direction for future identity research is the refinement and establishment of convergent validity among measures (both quantitative and qualitative) as well as ascertaining the effect of methodological variations on identity da-
The internal validity of identity research (and tests of theoretical propositions) will not be assured until the convergent validity and robustness of identity measures have been clearly demonstrated.

A fourth promising direction for future identity research is the exploration of the most effective ways in which content domains can be conceptualized and organized (one such method has been suggested in this article). This includes establishing a more uniform system of domains that are studied across theoretical orientations and measurement instruments. Understanding the structure of identity is of paramount importance if theorists and researchers are to study identity and intervene to promote its development. Establishing which domains are most related to one another and which domains are fairly independent from one another requires the standardization of identity domains across theoretical orientations and measurement instruments.

A final promising area for future identity research is the continued development and refinement of intervention programs that assist young people in establishing a coherent self and a place within a stable and supportive community. Now that identity has been firmly established as a construct worthy of theoretical and empirical attention, it is time to apply what is known about identity to help youth make their way in a society that has become increasingly complex and unstructured (cf. Côté, 1996b). Although early intervention work has proved promising, more work remains to be done in helping adolescents—particularly those from disadvantaged backgrounds—to establish a sense of self (Ferrer-Wreder et al., in press). Some of this work, such as standardizing and improving intervention procedures and offering help to greater numbers of adolescents, may require external funding.

As these, and other, directions are followed and identity theory and research, both basic and applied, continue to evolve, neo-Eriksonian understandings of identity will become more faithful to Erikson’s ideas, more multidimensional, and more applicable to other fields in the social sciences. All of these potential outcomes seem to indicate that the identity construct is coming of age.

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References


